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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE FUTURE OF THE EU AND NORTH AFRICA: RENEWABLES? 
 
 
 
 
The EU with its clean energy targets and advanced technology constitutes a perfect 
match in theory with renewable energy rich south Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia), which has not been the case yet. Further collaboration in the 
field of renewable energy between them has not been realized. The thesis argues that the 
EU’s one-size-fits-all approach alienates these states and slows down the process. 
Bilateral agreements based upon projects may be a solution to overcome this problem. 
Although among three of the initiatives handled, UfM is the closest to this solution 
there are still challenges caused by the states themselves. Energy subsidies, political 
uprisings, superiority of conventional resources and barriers due to financial and 
regulatory shortcomings are just some analyzed in the scope of this thesis. All of the 
problems were elaborated on individually using examples from the five countries 
mentioned above. Moreover two large-scale projects (Desertec and the MSP) were 
examined as case studies to bind the theoretical discussion to real-life situations. 
Although they were project-based initiatives the specific needs of the relevant countries 
were not taken into account again, which lead to their failure. Before reaching this 
conclusion, energy outlook and regulations related to renewables of the five states were 
analyzed in detail. After that the evolution of the EU – North African relations were 
dwelled on with emphasis on the renewables. Before the conclusion, future prospect of 
this relation was given.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
AVRUPA VE KUZEY AFRİKA’NIN GELECEĞİ: YENİLENEBİLİR ENERJİ? 
 
 
 
AB’nin yenilenebilir enerji hedefleri ve gelişmiş teknolojisi, yenilenebilir enerji 
kaynakları bol olan güney Akdeniz ülkeleriyle (Fas, Cezayir, Mısır, Libya, 
Tunus) teoride karlı bir ortaklığa işaret etmektedir. Fakat bu ortaklık günümüzde 
beklenen seviyeden çok uzakta kalmıştır. Bu tezin argümanı AB’nin tüm bu 
ülkelere aynı yaklaşımı uygulamasının onların ortaklığa yanaşmamasına neden 
olduğu yönündedir. Proje bazlı ikili ortaklıklar bu problemin aşılmasını sağlayabilir. 
Ele alınan üç büyük girişim içerisinde UfM bu hedefe en yakın olmasına rağmen 
ülkelerin kendilerinden kaynaklı engeller süreci yavaşlatmaya devam etmektedir. 
Devletlerin enerji sübvansiyonları, siyasal çalkantılar, alışılagelmiş enerji 
kaynaklarının önemini koruması, ekonomik ve bürokratik bariyerler bu tezin 
incelediği bazı engellerdir. Bütün bu sorunlar ayrı ayrı ülke bazında örneklerle ele 
alınmıştır. Bununla birlikte, iki büyük ölçekli proje olan Desertec ve MSP vaka 
incelemesi olarak ele alınarak teori ve pratik arasında bağ kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. 
Proje bazlı girişimler olmakla birlikte, girişimlerin başarısız olmasına neden, ilgili 
ülkelerin spesifik ihtiyaçlarının değerlendirmeye alınmamasıdır. Bu sonuca 
ulaşmadan önce beş ülkenin yenilenebilir enerji kaynakları ile ilgili veriler ve 
düzenlemeler detaylı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Ardından yenilenebilir kaynaklar 
üzerine vurgu yapılarak AB – Kuzey Afrika ülkelerinin ilişkilerindeki gelişim 
incelenmiştir. Son olarak da bu ilişkinin gelecekteki görünümü hakkındaki çıkarımlar 
ortaya konmuştur. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Qi (气) is defined as a life force and energy flow that sustains all living beings. 
The ancient Chinese believed that qi “permeated everything and linked their 
surroundings together.”1 Earth, the only known home for people, is shaped and altered 
by humans’ energies. In other words, constant change through energy is fundamental; it 
affects and connects people around the world. On March 11, 2011 at 2:46 pm Japan 
experienced one of the most powerful earthquakes leading to a tsunami and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster. In the following days, massive waves deprived nuclear 
reactors of cooling water and damaged plants released radiation. Power shortages and 
loss of industrial production interrupted the global supply chain and lead to the ‘global 
nuclear renaissance’.2 On January 20, 2011 in the town of Sidi Bouzid Tunisia, a young 
fruit seller named Mohamed Bouazizi poured flammable liquid and set himself on fire 
in front of the city hall. He was protesting against police’s constant harassment and 
local officials’ recklessness. This triggered the chain of events resulting in the end of 
Ben Ali’s 23-year rule, ten days after Bouazizi died.3 This incident was followed by 
Tahrir Square protests in Egypt, demonstrations in Benghazi, Libya and Yemeni 
revolution, later commonly known as the Arab Spring. Shock signals were sent to 
1 Manfred Porkert, The Theoretical Foundations of Chinese Medicine: Systems of 
Correspondence (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1974) p. 78. 
 
2 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remarking of the Modern World. 
(London: Allen Lane, 2011) p.2. 
 
3 Raina Abouzeid, “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire,” Times 
Magazine, January 21, 2011. Available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html  
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global energy market, as the spreading unrests ended authoritarian regimes in countries 
that provide 40 percent of oil used in the world.4 Hence, these two almost concurrent 
incidents had one thing in common: igniting insecurity of energy supply. Here energy 
security is measured through the reliability, affordability of supply and the friendliness 
of the environment.5 The regular and smooth access to supplies with a sustainable price 
is the components of a trustworthy relationship between the demander and supplier 
sides. Both have to ensure the uninterrupted flow of energy sources and commit to the 
agreements signed.  
 
 The ancient name for the Mediterranean is Mare Nostrum, the Latin for ‘our 
sea’, and the idea of Mediterranean as a regional entity derives from this term. Looking 
back to the Roman Empire, the area was actually united culturally and politically for a 
long time. However this is not the case any longer. The cultural, economic and political 
legacy has been forgotten and replaced with conflict, rivalry and fragmentation. 
Through the rise of Christianity, Islam and nationalism, several conquests, have all 
added to the process. Hence the unitary Mediterranean in the political sense has ceased 
to exist.6 According to Balta, today there are six Mediterraneans to deal with: the EU 
member in the west; Turkey; the Balkans; the Arab East; Israel; and North Africa;7 all 
shaped by different motives ranging from inter-ethnic conflict to colonialism. Hence, 
due to their historical, economic and political means, all the states have different paces 
of development. In this thesis, the relations between the ‘advanced’ European and 
‘backward’ North African countries, especially in the energy field are discussed. 
Although both of the regions are taken as a single entity in this thesis, it is a known fact 
4 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remarking of the Modern World. 
(London: Allen Lane, 2011) p.2. 
 5 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics. (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2010) p. 93  
6 Pere Vilanova, ‘What if the Mediterranean would not or does not exist? Exploring 
heterodox hypothesis’ Paper presented at the Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political 
Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme 19 – 23 March 2003, organized by 
the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at 
the European University Institute. 
 7 Paul Balta, “Cultural Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,” IEMED 
Annual Articles. Available at: http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2009/aarticles/a293.pdf  
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that the countries of North Africa are deeply divided. The EU is also dealing with the 
disagreements of its member states while also trying to implement its norms in other 
territories. In terms of North Africa, the European Neighborhood Policy, Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and Union for the Mediterranean are just three of such 
attempts. The deep fragmentation of the region, preeminence of state interests and many 
other reasons that are discussed at length throughout the thesis have led to the failure of 
these initiatives and the integration between the two shores could therefore not be 
realized.  
 This thesis considers the reasons for the lack of full collaboration in the energy 
sector. The argument is that the EU’s one-size-fits-all approach harms the process and 
bilateral cooperation that can evolve first to sub-regional and then to regional levels can 
be a better solution. This thesis begins with the current energy outlook of North Africa, 
followed by the second chapter, which discusses challenges faced by this region. 
Throughout the thesis North Africa and South Mediterranean have been used 
interchangeably to indicate Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The energy 
subsidies, supremacy of fossil fuels over the renewables, the lack of infrastructure, and 
political turmoil are the chronic problems of the five countries that are elaborated on. 
Three of the states are fossil fuels exporters and due to the climate and wind regime, all 
have renewable energies potential. The proximity of these countries to Europe and the 
great renewable potential are the reasons why these states were examined in this thesis. 
Even though they possess various renewable resources, the EU has the technology to 
make efficient use of these sources. Hence, the collaboration between the two shores 
seems profitable. Chapter three analyzes the cooperation between the two regions. It 
specifically looks into the EMP, ENP, and UfM as three of the institutionalized attempts 
of the EU to develop closer integration. Emphasis was places upon the initiatives to 
boost the renewable energy cooperation and the causes for failure to achieve the goal. 
The following chapter discussed the barriers to the renewable energies relations 
between North Africa and Europe. The financial and regulatory obstacles were 
examined and the Mediterranean Solar Plan and DESERTEC were used as two case 
studies that indicate the problems with large-scale projects. Lastly, the future prospects 
were mentioned to give a glimpse of the possible scenarios. Some solutions are also 
provided especially for the financial obstacles. The scope of the thesis did not allow a 
comprehensive discussion of the following issues. 
 
 3 
The issue of nuclear energy as an alternative to the RES was not discussed, as 
there is a slim chance that all the states of South Mediterranean can acquire the nuclear 
technology in the coming years. Although they have considered it as a profitable 
alternative to fossil fuels, acquiring the technology is not easy. To begin with, the 
member states of the EU would not be willing to share the information, since the 
technology can also be used to build nuclear weapons. Even if the technology is 
acquired, the North African countries have to attract huge amounts of FDI, which looks 
difficult if they as remain authoritarian regimes in the near future. In addition, solar and 
wind energy were the only two RES that were emphasized. The hydropower and 
biomass as the other alternatives for sustainable and clean energy production were not 
mentioned in length. Since solar and wind are untapped energy resources that can 
flourish through large-scale projects, greater consideration was given to them. The role 
of Turkey is this region and in the negotiation process was also not mentioned, 
especially since during the last few years Turkey’s influence has deteriorated and the 
zero-problems with neighbors strategy has failed. And in the RE field in particular no 
significant relations were developed. The EU is most certainly a more effective actor in 
this region compared to Turkey. Finally, energy is a topic that changes and evolves 
everyday. New agreements are signed, some others end and politics get involved in the 
flow of energy constantly. While the most recent news is followed throughout the 
thesis-writing period, some developments may have been overlooked. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Current Energy Situation in North Africa 
 
 
This chapter elaborates on the current situation of North African countries’ 
energy position and the challenges faced while developing RE technologies. In the first 
part the energy outlook of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia are discussed. 
These states can be divided roughly into two categories: energy importers and 
exporters. Libya and Algeria have oil and natural gas reserves whereas Morocco and 
Tunisia are deprived of both. Egypt was an oil and natural gas exporter country but 
today it only exports the latter due to its increasing demand. Each of the countries’ 
renewable energy potential and projects to encourage the rising share in the energy mix 
are discussed in this chapter as well. The second part of this chapter considers the three 
pressing problems faced by these states: energy subsidies, preference of conventional 
resources over RES and lack of infrastructure. Some plausible explanations regarding 
why the countries choose to subsidize their energy prices and favor fossil fuels over 
RES are given. Before proceeding with the plan above, the next paragraph explains the 
concepts of rentier state and Dutch disease.  
 
Before analyzing the countries, one point shall be made. For years the policy-
makers have presumed that if a country has natural resources and exports them the state 
and citizens prosper. The logic behind was simple: significant profits are gained via 
natural resource trade, which leads to investments in other areas and increasing 
employment. In the 1990s empirical research has indicated the opposite: being natural 
resource rich is actually a curse. 8  Especially for many MENA countries, natural 
8 Christa N. Brunnschweiler and Erwin H. Bulte, “Economics: Linking Natural 
Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict,” Science 320, no. 5876 (2008): 616-617.  
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resource revenues are the only source of income and the development of other industries 
are prevented as a result. In some cases, due to the large revenues the national 
currency’s value raises and the imported goods become cheaper. Hence, local industries 
are not able to compete and they prefer to specialize in the natural resources sector as 
well. The economies become very vulnerable to price fluctuations, the more they 
depend on this sector. 9  This situation is called the ‘Dutch Disease’ 10 , due to the 
dominance of the hydrocarbon sector, the expansion of other sectors is limited and 
diversification is almost impossible. In addition, the lack of good governance makes 
way for corruption creating a vicious cycle. Eventually, the governments’ ability to 
deliver the necessary services fall, so does the well being of the citizens. Eventually 
they become rentier states. The tables below (Table 1 and 2) can be interpreted in the 
light of this information. The population growth of this region and the rising energy 
demand makes the collaboration of the two shores more urgent. However, considering 
the figures, GDP growth solely based on exports would be harmful for the southern 
Mediterranean countries, hence the cooperation shall be based upon the provision of 
sustainable growth. As mentioned before, the development of renewable energy 
technology is the best candidate in this sense. Especially Algeria and Libya have 
particularly large reserves of oil and natural gas, making them potential candidates for 
the ‘resource curse’. Considering also all the countries’ history of colonization, 
traumatic independence process and huge amounts of debt, overdependence on natural 
resources revenues is a concomitant. The next section gives a detailed analysis of the 
North African countries’ energy outlook.  
 
 
 
9 Price Water House Coopers, “100 percent renewable electricity: A roadmap to 2050 
for Europe and North Africa,” Available at: www.pwc.com/sustainability  
 
10 Dutch disease is the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a 
sharp inflow of foreign currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves. The 
currency inflows lead to currency appreciation, making the country’s other products less 
price competitive on the export market. It also leads to higher levels of cheap imports 
and can lead to deindustrialisation as industries apart from resource exploitation are 
moved to cheaper locations. The origin of the phrase is the Dutch economic crisis of the 
1960s following the discovery of North Sea natural gas. 
http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=dutch-disease  
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Table 1: South West Mediterranean Population Prospects (million)11 
 
 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 Annual 
growth per 
year 
Algeria 33 35 41 45 1,2% 
Egypt 74 81 94 106 1.4% 
Libya 6 6 8 8 1.4% 
Other 
South West 
(Morocco & 
Tunisia) 
40 43 47 51 1% 
 
 
 
Table 2: South West Mediterranean’s GDP (trillions of US dollars, PPP)12 
 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 Annual 
growth per 
year 
Algeria 206 278 474 664 4.8% 
Egypt 120 138 172 202 2.1% 
Libya 44 46 52 60 1.3% 
Other 
South West 
(Morocco & 
Tunisia) 
65 75 95 115 2.3% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 United Nations, World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision (New York: Population 
Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN, 2006) p.49. 
 12 Ibid. 51 
 7 
                                                        
2.1 North African States’ Energy Outlook 
 
This section starts with a brief characterization of the five (Tunisia, Morocco, 
Algeria, Libya, Egypt) North African countries, followed by a discussion of the region’s 
energy outlook with an emphasis on the RES potential. The tables above indicate the 
population, GDP and energy demand growth that have led to greater energy production 
and imports. Out of the five countries Tunisia and Morocco are net energy importers 
whereas Algeria and Libya are net exporters and Egypt is an oil importer and natural 
gas exporter. Although it has some oil and gas reserves, Tunisia has been an energy 
importer since 2000. Throughout the 2000s its two main primary energy resources were 
petroleum products (around 50 percent) and natural gas (around 40 percent).13 The net 
electricity demand has been rising about 5 – 6 percent every year and it is mainly based 
on natural gas (95 percent). RES’ contribution is still negligible; in 2008, 3313 MW was 
produced mostly by the thermal power plants, hydroelectricity, and wind power. 
Nuclear power has also become an option for Tunisia: since 2006, several collaboration 
accords have been signed with France. 14 Another energy importer in this region is 
Morocco; around 98 percent of its primary energy supply is being purchased. It has no 
conventional natural gas and oil reserves. Like Tunisia, most of its electricity demand is 
met via petroleum products (60 percent) and coal (25 percent). Here again, RES are just 
supplying 2 percent of the need, which is around 5292 MW, and thermal power plants, 
hydroelectricity and wind farms are the main sources. Coal is going to keep its place as 
one of the main fuels of power generation in the coming decades, but in order to 
diversify its supplies feasibility studies for nuclear energy in Sidi Boulbra have been 
conducted.15 This was a general profile of the two energy importers among the Maghreb 
13 Nikolaus Superberger and Laura Führer, “Integration of renewable energies and 
nuclear power into North African Energy Systems: An Analysis of energy import and 
export effects”, Energy Policy 39 (2011): 4459. 
 
14 Reuters, “France seals nuclear, aid deals with Tunisia,” Available at: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/04/23/idUKLN941296  
 
15 Sammy Salama, “Moroccan nuclear energy program gets boost from Russia,” WMD 
Insights, Available at: 
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I11/I11_AF1_MoroccanNuclear.htm  
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countries; the energy exporters Algeria and Libya will be discussed in the following 
paragraph.  
 
Algeria is blessed with reserves of oil and natural gas, but these resources can 
also be seen as a curse for this country. Its GDP is much too dependent on gas and oil 
exports. 16 For instance, the fertile soils in the northern part of the country are not 
cultivated, and the agricultural sector accounts merely for 7.6 percent of the GDP.17 
Hence, the green energy and nuclear sectors are underdeveloped. Libya’s energy mix is 
dominated by oil and natural gas as well, but its energy demand is rising in an 
accelerated rate that leads to many blackouts. The state has tried to curb the dominance 
of oil by constructing new plants fired by natural gas. 18  Like Tunisia, it seeks 
international support for its nuclear plants and in 2006 the first agreement with France 
was signed.19 The same attempts are not available for RES, again the same reasons 
apply to this rentier state. 
 
 The last state to be discussed about is Egypt, which has a different category as 
an oil importer and gas exporter. Although until the late 1990s Egypt was a self-
sufficient country in terms of oil consumption, the decline in production, and growth in 
domestic demand have reversed this condition. The discovery of large gas reserves has 
16 Hydrocarbon exports constituted almost 98 percent of total exports in 2007 and these 
sectors accounted for 46 percent of the GDP. African Development Bank and OECD, 
“African Economic Outlook 2008,” Available at: http:// 
www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_15162846_39963489_1_1_1_ 1,00.html 
 
17 African Development Bank and OECD, “African Economic Outlook 2008,” 
Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_15162846_39963489_1_1_1_ 
1,00.html 
 
18 Nikolaus Supersberger et. al. “Energy systems in OPEC countries of the Middle East 
and North Africa. System analytic comparison of nuclear power, renewable energies 
and energy efficiency.” Available at: 
http://www.ps.boell.org/downloads/Wuppertal_Institut_Energy_Systems_OPEC_Count
ries.pdf  
 
19 World Nuclear Association, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” Last Modified: 
November 2013, Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html  
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quadrupled its production over the last decade and around 15 billion m3 have been 
exported in the same period. 20 Domestic electricity consumption has been on the rise, 
increasing at an average of 7 percent in the last 10 years. Egypt currently has two 
nuclear research reactors and aims to construct the third by 2015.21 It is not certain how 
this plan will turn out after the Arab Spring. This comment is actually valid for all the 
other countries that are discussed here; the uncertain political situation and the rise of 
new parties have complicated the short-term energy plans. The continued economic 
expansion and resistance to curb demand growth can eventually lead to energy 
shortages and disrupt the development. Hence, this region’s collaboration with the EU 
is inevitable if they want to curb their energy dependency or diversify their energy mix 
using the RES. In the following paragraphs, the energy outlook of the northern and 
southern shores of the Mediterranean is discussed before proceeding with the condition 
of the EU – Northern African energy cooperation in the subsequent section.  
 
As distinct from the previous paragraph, the energy trends of the Northern 
Mediterranean EU countries and Maghreb states will be reviewed together to indicate 
the urgency of closer cooperation between the two shores. To begin with this region 
accounts for 8 percent of the energy demand in the world and on average the region’s 
dependence will grow by 2 percent per annum. Oil and natural gas constitute a big share 
in this rising energy demand. Moreover, it seems that natural gas will overtake oil after 
2025, accounting for 36 percent of the need at 500 Mtoe. 22  With technological 
advances, several policies and incentives, especially non-hydro renewables are expected 
to have a bigger share in the energy mix. Considering this region’s vulnerability to 
devastating results of climate change, switching to green energy options would be a 
wise move. Traditionally, the Mediterranean region has been blessed with RES like 
biomass and hydropower. In the recent years solar and wind have also increased their 
20 Sameh Fahmy, “National Oil and Gas Strategy 2000,” Available at: 
www.ngv2006.com.  
 
21 Ministry of Electricity and Energy, “Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, Annual 
Report,” Available at: http://www.moee.gov.eg/english/Takareer/2009-2010.pdf  
 
22 Observatoire Mediterraneen de L’Energie, Mediterranean Energy Perspective 2011, 
(OME: Nanterre, 2011): 31.  
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share in the energy production mix, although most of them are used in the residential 
sector. Thus, the enormous potential can be used if capital, increased regional 
collaboration and stronger political will are available. In addition, North and South 
Mediterranean countries have common energy challenges and complementary assets: 
the former having the know-how while the latter the potential to be developed. In the 
south, the cost of producing electricity from photovoltaic solar technology is expected 
to be around 10 cents (US), which is profitable.23 At both sides of the Mediterranean, 
countries want to take part in this energy transition and partnerships among them can 
lead to a win-win situation. The coming section analyzes the five North African 
countries’ energy situation individually.  
        
2.1.1. Algeria 
 
Algeria is blessed with fossil fuels and renewable energy resources. Oil was first 
discovered in 1956 and the national council estimates a vast hydrocarbon potential as 
the state-owned Sonatrach and foreign companies have made huge oil and gas 
discoveries in the recent years. The proven reserves are around 11.3 billion barrels, 
while the estimate is 43 billion barrels of recoverable oil resources. Due to the increase 
in domestic natural gas consumption, most of the discovered oil can be exported. 
Today, nearly 90 percent of crude oil is sold to Western Europe. Natural gas export 
started in 1961, and in 2000 the production reached 60 percent of the total hydrocarbon 
production. Today, one-fifth of EU’s natural gas demand is met by Algeria. This figure 
is going to rise as new gas fields, export pipelines, and LNG facilities commercialize.24 
In terms of electricity, 54 percent the national demand is satisfied via SONELGAZ and 
the rest by the other producers. The distribution network has developed since 1970 and 
23 Moncef Ben Abdallah, Samir Allal, Jacques Kappauf and Mourad Preure “Towards A 
Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community: Moving from Import-Export to a New 
Regional Energy Model,” IPEMED. Available at: 
http://www.ipemed.coop/adminIpemed/media/fich_article/1373880614_Towards%20a
%20Euro-Mediterranean%20Energy%20Community.pdf  
 
24 MEDREC, “Country Report: Algeria”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2  
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reached 256,302 km in 2010.25 The potential for renewable energy is high, especially 
due to the Sahara, where the solar potential reaches 170,000 TW/h, which is the highest 
in the world. This territory is exposed over 2000 hours of sunshine per year. The wind 
energy potential varies according to the region: the average speed of wind is 1 – 4 m/s 
whereas in the south it exceeds 6 m/s. Another untapped source is geothermal energy. 
There are approximately 200 hot springs, of which one third have temperatures above 
45 0C and they have an estimated potential of electricity generation at 700 MW.26 The 
Algerian government is aware of its RES outlook and a legal framework has been 
integrated to the national energy policy. Hence, the total production is expected to 
exceed 400 TWh in the period of 2011 – 2030. Three phases have been identified to 
implement the RE projects: 2011 – 2013 the test of various sectors, 2014 – 2015 the 
deployment of renewable electricity program, 2016 – 2020 period was dedicated to the 
acceleration of such projects. The Center for the Development of Renewable Energy 
Sources (CDER) is also doing research on the development of solar, wind, and 
geothermal sources.27 Overall, 5 percent share of solar in the electricity production is 
aimed between 2000 and 2025.  
 
Table 3: Solar characteristics by region 28 
 
Region North Highlands Sahara 
Area (%) 4 10 86 
Average duration of sunshine (h/year) 2 650 3 000 3 500 
Average Energy received (kWh/m2/year) 1 700 1 900 2 650 
25 European Commission, “Paving the Way for the MSP: Country Report Algeria”, 
Available at: http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/index.php?option=com_downloads&task=category&cid=7&Itemid=56  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Reegle, “Algerian CDER”, Available at: http://www.reegle.info/actors/3222/algerian-
centre-for-renewable-energy-development.htm  
 
28 Amine Boudghene Stambouli, “Algerian renewable energy assessment: The 
challenge of sustainability,” Energy Policy 39, (2011): 4510. 
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2.1.2 Egypt 
 
Egypt is a major oil and LNG transit point from Persian Gulf to Europe. It is 
also one of the largest oil producers and the second largest natural gas producer in 
Africa. In the recent years, it has had difficulties meeting its domestic energy needs due 
to falling production and increasing demand. Although the natural gas exports have 
been declining since 2009, new discoveries may revive the production in the coming 
years.29 The trouble to satisfy the domestic demand has led the government to focus on 
an untapped domestic energy source: renewables. Geographically Egypt is in an 
excellent position in terms of solar availability. Around 90 percent of it has an average 
radiation rate over 2200 kWh/m2 per year. The Ministry of Electricity and Energy 
(MEE) has initiated the photovoltaic (PV) projects and currently the capacity is about 3 
MW. Operation of several solar thermal power plants will start through the Integrated 
Solar Combined Cycle System (ISCCS) in Kuraymat with a capacity of 150 MW. 
Furthermore, the high wind speed on the Gulf of Suez, north of the Red Sea Coast, and 
east Oweinat facilitates the energy potential. Hence, a contract with the Spanish 
government to construct 85 MW of wind turbine was signed. In the Gulf of El-Zayt an 
area about 700 km2 has been dedicated for new wind farms that will have the capacity 
of 3500 MW by 2022.30 Regardless, with a population over 80 million and a growing 
economy, the energy demand will continue to increase. It is promising that, despite the 
state-led economy, the energy sector has been more liberal compared to its neighbors. 
Its partnership and collaboration with major energy companies has been successful. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the Suez Canal and SUMED are key for the petroleum 
and gas transit, and related revenues have a substantial share in the national income. If 
Egypt proceeds with its utilization program for renewable energy, economic 
development, and energy security can be guaranteed.  
 
 
 
29 EIA, “Egypt: Country Analysis Brief Overview”, Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=eg. Last modified: July 31, 2013. 
 
30 MEDREC, “Chapter II: Egypt”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2 
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2.1.3. Libya 
 
The country’s small population (6.5 million), limited agricultural activity, and 
lack of industrial base distinguish Libya from other North African countries. It 
resembles the Gulf countries that have extensive oil and gas reserves. Today, the oil 
sector provides 70 percent of its GDP and it has the largest amount of proved crude oil 
(48 billion barrels – 2013) in Africa and it has been a member of OPEC since 1962.31 In 
addition, Libya holds the fourth largest natural gas reserves on the continent. However, 
the hydrocarbon production was disrupted by the civil unrest in 2011. Although the 
production level recovered in 2012, due to the on-going protests in key oil ports in the 
central and eastern parts it remained low.32 In terms of natural gas, the exports grew 
after 2003 due to the development of the Western Libya Gas project and opening of the 
Greenstream pipeline to Italy. Production grew three times and became 594 bcf during 
the period between 2003 and 2010, but again due to the civil war the exports via 
Greenstream fell over 60 percent in 2012. 33 Moreover, just recently Libyan Berber 
protesters have shut the gas pipeline down demanding more rights.34 Hence, even an 
exporter country like Libya needs to diversify its energy mix by adding renewables into 
the equation. The solar potential is high with 3000 – 3500 hours of sun radiation per 
annum as 88 percent of the territory is desert and flat. However, a lack of access to 
water makes the solar regime less profitable. In 2006 1.865 kWp of PV was installed 
and it continues to grow especially in the rural areas. In terms of wind energy, the 
average speed is between 6 – 7.5 m/s, which makes it an attractive place to invest. A 
31 EIA, “Libya: Analysis”, Last modified: October 10, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY  
 
32 Reegle, “Energy Profile Libya”, Available at: http://www.reegle.info/countries/libya-
energy-profile/LY  
 
33 Compared to 332 Bcf in 2010. BP, “2013 Statistical Review”, Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-
review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf   
 34 Reuters, “Libyan Berbers shut gas pipeline to Italy, cut major income source,” Last 
modified: November 11, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/11/us-libya-gas-idUSBRE9AA0UT20131111   
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German – Danish consortium constructed a 25 MW pilot wind farm and several other 
appropriate sites were found to install more facilities. In addition, 5 new wind farms 
with a total capacity of 600 MW were also announced prior to the 2011 revolution.35 
Obviously, most of the projects could not be realized and the future of the energy sector 
depends on the course of political events.  
 
2.1.4. Morocco 
 
High dependency on fossil fuels imports (around 97 percent) has altered 
Morocco’s energy policy. Diversifying the supply sources and making use of the 
domestic renewable energy potential have been prioritized. The ‘Strategic National Plan 
for the Development of RES’ foresees RES’ contribution to be 20 percent by 2020.36 
After detailed research some pilot projects of electrical infrastructure have considered 
the role of RES seriously. Its proximity to Spain (14 km) makes Morocco the best 
candidate for a functioning electricity interconnection with the EU.37 Elaborating on the 
renewable energy potential, especially solar energy is particularly significant. The 
radiation levels range from 2800 to 3400 hours respectively in the northern and 
southern parts, and reaches almost 5.6 kWh/day. 38  Solar PV systems have been 
available since the 1980s to meet the rural electrification and water pumping programs 
needs. The table below (Table 4) also indicates the expected increase in investments due 
to efforts by the government to promote RES and acceleration of international funds. 39  
35 IRENA (2010) "Renewable energy country profile: Libya". Available at: 
http://www.irena.org/REmaps/countryprofiles/africa/Libya.pdf  
 
36 Kingdom of Morocco, “National Action Plan”, Available at: 
http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/National-Plan-of-Morocco.pdf  
 
37 Rafael de Arce, Ramón Mahía, Eva Medina and Gonzalo Escribano, “A simulation of 
the economic impact of renewable energy in Morocco”, Energy Policy 46 (2012): 335.  
 
38 MEDREC, “Chapter III: Morocco”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2 
 
39 Tax and duties deduction, establishment of credit structures, subsidies for households 
etc.  
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In the coming years Morocco also wants to consolidate and capitalize its efforts in the 
renewable energy sector. In this way some significant contribution to the supply 
security, competitiveness of the productive sector and protection of the environment can 
be achieved. There are also several structuring programs adding to the high renewable 
potential of Morocco. For instance the electrification program aims to launch 200 MW 
in the short run and 350 MW of wind energy in the long run, while 250 MW of solar 
thermal power is in preparation. 40  Like Egypt, Morocco can also make use of its 
geographical location. Considering the EU’s target to increase the share of the RES in 
its energy mix, Morocco is the best candidate among the Maghreb countries due to its 
proximity to Spain. Thus, once Morocco can meet its domestic demand, the RE exports 
to the EU can contribute to its economic development.  
                                      
Table 4: Estimates of the Investments41 
 
Energy sector billion $ 
Solar Program 9 
Wind Program 3.5 
Coal 3.5 
Transmission + interconnection 1.1 
Oil sector 1.65 
  Total                                                                                           20.95                               
 
2.1.5. Tunisia 
 
Tunisia is a medium income country and has had a steady GDP growth since the 
late 1980s. To be able to keep the economic growth sustainable, energy has been the 
main priority of the government, because since the end of 1980s the stagnation in 
hydrocarbon sources and the accelerated rise in the domestic energy demand, 
deficiencies have occurred. In order to reverse this problem, Tunisia has engaged in 
efficient energy policies. The discovery and exploitation of new reserves together with 
the facilitation of energy to the whole population were the two main elements. 
40 European Commission, “Paving the way for MSP: Country Report Morocco”, 
Available at: http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/index.php?option=com_downloads&task=category&cid=7&Itemid=56 
 41MEDREC, “Chapter III: Morocco”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2  
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Moreover, the government has also encouraged the development of renewable sources 
and energy efficiency. The National Agency for Energy Conservation (ANME) was 
established for the promotion of the RES, because Tunisia’s hot and dry climate and flat 
geography enables the production of solar and wind energy. The annual radiation level 
varies between 1500 and 1900 kWh/m2 and the average temperature is 90C.42 Although 
the renewable sector is not advanced yet, establishment of a veritable market and a 
number of surface wells with solar pumps are alongside the national program. The 
Tunisian Solar Plan aims to reduce the hydrocarbon use by 660 Ktoe in 2016, which is 
22 percent of the national consumption.43 In terms of wind, the ‘on shore’ potential is 
about 3 MWh per year. The Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company (STEG) constructed 
a 10 MWh wind energy plant in Sidi Daoud. Moreover, with the support of ANME, 
several barriers and constraints to international cooperation could be lifted. Hence, it 
became possible to acquire ‘know-how’ in this field. To this day, Tunisia’s interest and 
efforts to develop renewable energies have been great due to the political will, but still 
the share of renewables in the energy mix is limited. An effective capitalization of its 
renewable energy potential will help the country to boost this sector.  
 
2.2 Challenges 
 
The analysis above indicates that almost all North African countries have to 
cope with accelerating energy demand. However, their supply situations vary from one 
another: Morocco and Tunisia are net importers, whereas Algeria, Libya and Egypt are 
blessed with hydrocarbons to some extent. Hence, these variations impact the overall 
energy integration in different fields, especially renewables and nuclear have not been 
serious options for these countries. For energy importers and exporters this meant 
continued dependency on fossil fuels. Today, the countries also face domestic problems 
such as poverty, high levels of unemployment, and fast demographic growth. Energy is 
key to resolving all of these issues, but due to low pricing policies, and inefficient use, 
the South Mediterranean countries are under constant pressure. Succinctly, the current 
42 MEDREC, “Chapter IV: Tunisia”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2 
 
43 European Commission, “Paving the way for MSP: Country Report Tunisia”, 
Available at: http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/index.php?option=com_downloads&task=category&cid=7&Itemid=56.  
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situation is not sustainable if this rapid population growth and urbanization continues. 
The infrastructure cannot cope with the rising domestic demand and full-scale 
investments in electricity, oil and gas networks are urgent. Even for the exporter 
countries, the big share of hydrocarbon trade creates structural socioeconomic, and 
financial imbalances. As mentioned before this situation is known as the ‘Dutch 
Disease’, due to the high dependence of the fossils fuels export, other sectors are not 
able to develop. This also causes rent-seeking strategies that are harmful to economic 
growth and lock the countries into a single sector and commodity market. In the 
following section four of the problems will be elaborated on: energy subsidies, 
dominance of conventional energy sources, lack of infrastructure, and political 
problems.  
 
2.2.1 Energy subsidies 
 
All of the North African countries heavily subsidize their energy prices for 
macroeconomic management. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that 
the global energy subsidies will increase substantially and reach $660 billion annually 
by 2020.44 Energy importer states like Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are confronted by 
rising energy expenses caused by increasing international energy prices. On the other 
side, the exporter countries like Algeria and Libya encounter higher differentials 
between global market prices and domestic subsidized prices.45 Maintaining such tight 
control on domestic energy prices is seen as a strategic tool for the promotion of 
industrialization. In this way the aim was to keep the unemployment levels low. In 
addition, citizens’ income is protected and state benefits are distributed to the 
population.46 Even the people with the lowest income have access to energy resources 
and this adds to the poverty alleviation efforts. The commodity price fluctuations are 
44 Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, “MENA energy transition strategy: A call for leadership 
in energy innovation”, Energy Strategy Reviews 2, (2013): 6.  
 
45 Nikolaus Supersberger and Laura Führer, “Integration of renewable energies and 
nuclear power into North African Energy Systems: An Analysis of energy import and 
export effects”, Energy Policy 39 (2011): 4462. 
 
46 Bassam Fattouh and Laura El-Katiri, “Energy subsidies in the Middle East and North 
Africa”, Energy Strategy Reviews 2 (2013): 108. 
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prevented against the volatile prices in the international markets, hence inflation is also 
kept under control and the economy’s competitiveness in the global era is enhanced. 
Although the governments of the Maghreb region may have the agenda of keeping their 
people content, interfering in the market in such an artificial way has serious 
consequences.  
 
 The same energy subsidies also affect people’s behavior, discourage energy 
savings, and damage the environment. Furthermore, price signals are misrepresented 
and systemic miscalculations of resources become chronic. Most importantly, the 
structural supply scarcity becomes a chronic problem with the ever-increasing energy 
demand. Electricity theft, ineffective power plants and distribution systems also add to 
the problem.47 When one digs deep into the root of the problem, the non-competitive 
state monopolies are confronted. Of particular importance the infrastructure projects 
cannot be realized due to the inflexible electricity market structure.48 In recent years 
several Maghreb countries have tried to reverse this situation by implementing 
electricity market reforms. For instance Algeria passed an electricity law in 2002 aimed 
at unbundling the electricity and gas monopolist Sonelgaz’s activities and establishing 
an independent regulatory body. 49  Tunisia and Algeria have also taken steps to 
liberalize their electricity sectors and gave independent power producers (IPP) rights to 
access the market. However, despite these reform efforts, the states are still far from 
their targets. Market operations are performed mostly by state utilities holding 
electricity purchase monopolies. Clearly, a statist economy that controls the energy 
prices is not compatible with the global free market economy. Sooner or later the 
structure is doomed to collapse.   
 
 
47 Ibid. 
 
48 Bernhard Brand and Jonas Zingerle, “The renewable energy targets of the Maghreb 
countries: Impact on electricity supply and conventional power markets”, Energy Policy 
39 (2011): 4411.  
 
49 Algerian Electricity Law No. 02-01, 2002. Journal officiel de la Republique Algeri- 
enne 13, (February 6, 2002) p.4. 
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2.2.2. Conventional resources over RES 
 
The advantage of RES over the hydrocarbon sources is the lower volatility of 
prices. In addition, the RE contracts extend from 15 to 25 years and they fix the prices 
or index them to inflation.50 Hence, they are much more predictable than fossil fuels 
that are impacted by every other crisis. RES is a domestic energy resource that also 
enables the governments to make long-term commitments to their citizens. For instance, 
new industries can flourish and help to alleviate unemployment. In terms of the finance, 
development costs are usually taken care of feed-in tariffs by the EU. Although the 
tariffs have fallen substantially in recent years development of RES technology via the 
EU may also lead to the cooperation in other areas, benefiting both sides in the long 
term. Diversification of the energy mix away from the fossil fuels is another very 
significant advantage of switching to the RES. Taking into account the rising prices of 
oil and natural gas supply in the last decade; diversification of supply is the best option 
to secure the energy flow. Although the arguments draw an optimistic picture, in reality 
the switch to RES is not that smooth. 
 
The background information on the Maghreb countries’ energy mix indicates the 
high dependency on fossil fuels. In addition, all these countries have faced economic 
stagnation during the global financial crisis and during the Arab Spring in particular. 
Thus, the change from conventional energy resources to technology-based renewables 
looks very unlikely in the near future. Moreover, the majority of the literature has found 
a correlation with greater GDP levels and a tendency to protect the environment by 
switching to RES.51 Considering the income levels and unstable political situations of 
the North African countries, prioritization of renewable energies seems unlikely. 
Governments may also be discouraged due to the long adjustment period. What seems 
to be a means to boost economic development can turn out to be a significant burden on 
the budget. Other findings also indicate a possibility of little or negative contribution of 
50 Shimon Awerbuch and Raphael Sauter, “Exploiting the oil GDP effect to support 
renewables deployment,” Energy Policy 34  (2006) p. 2810 (2805–2819) 
 
51 Ming-Yuan Huang, Janaki R.R. Alavalapati, Douglas R. Carter, Matthew H. 
Langholtz, “Is the Choice of renewable portfolio standard random?” Energy Policy 35, 
(2007): 5572.  
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RES to economic growth. Marques and Fuinhas have found out that the intensive use of 
renewables hinders economic growth, when the share of RES in the supply increases by 
1 percent; economic growth decreases by 3 percent in ceteris paribus. The logic behind 
this fall is the high cost of renewables compared to hydrocarbon sources. Here the 
increase in the use of renewables also implies the declining share of other energy 
resources.52  In addition, the use of renewable energy can cause the substitution of 
technologies. The production capacity based on the fossil fuels may fall due to the 
abandonment of the technology since it is economically inefficient to use both 
technologies. The advancements in the technologies of conventional resources may also 
be neglected and result in accidents.53 As a consequence, the slowing down of short- 
and medium-term economic growth may be inevitable. The research only takes into 
account the opportunity cost of enhancing the renewables, thus it lacks the ability to 
predict the long-term consequences of switching to RES. There is still a long way to go 
in the R&D, which will result in more profitable ways to deploy the technology.  
 
2.2.3. Lack of network infrastructure 
 
If energy is the blood, infrastructure is the vein connecting the supply and 
demand side to enable the system to live. Hence, having a proper and modern 
infrastructure is vital for the economy of a country. Except LNG, all the other energy 
resources need some kind of a network infrastructure to be transmitted. The Map 1 
shows clearly the pipeline connections between the two shores of the Mediterranean.  
Considering the geography of the Mediterranean region the importance of having a 
proper infrastructure stands out. Since the Mediterranean Sea separates the northern and 
southern shores, constructing pipelines and electricity grids are expensive and time-
consuming endeavors. Rapid population growth, urbanization and economic growth 
necessitate a substantial increase in their power generation and transmission capacity of 
the North African region. However, as mentioned before, the non-competitive state 
monopolies have difficulty with financing projects. This situation has changed with the 
52 António Cardoso Marques and José Alberto Fuinhas, “Is renewable energy effective 
in promoting growth?” Energy Policy 46, (2012): 439.  
 
53 Ibid.  
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Arab Spring, as new discoveries of natural gas (Egypt and Mediterranean Sea) have 
occurred and projects to increase the share of RES are established. During the uprisings 
the Northern African countries’ economies were hurt. After the protests cooled down, 
the new regimes were looking for ways to boost their GDP, and energy trade came to 
the front as one of the best option, resulting in several action plans and RE projects 
aimed at integrating this region to the EU. Especially for the renewable energy projects 
like MSP and DESERTEC the construction and modernization of energy infrastructure 
is crucial. Obviously, these are large-scale plans concerning all of the Maghreb 
countries that necessitate collaboration on the regional level.54 In terms of natural gas, 
the map (Map no.1 below) shows the existing pipelines. Building LNG facilities is 
expensive and it creates short-term commitments, since the transportation is done via 
tank ships. Whereas, natural gas pipelines require long-term and full commitment of 
both the supply and demand side parties. This feature is the main reason of the slow 
development of energy infrastructure. Although diversifying the energy mix using 
North African resources would add to the EU’s energy security, the political tensions 
deter the decision. The possibility of supply disruption due to terrorism, insurgency and 
sabotage has also discouraged the construction of infrastructure. 55 This picture may 
change in the future through the EU’s efforts. In the next section, political regimes and 
the Arab uprisings as the fourth challenge is discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 Price Waterhouse Coopers, “100% renewable electricity. A roadmap to 2050 for 
Europe and North Africa,” Available at: 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/100_percent_renewable_electricity.pdf     
 
55 Wolfram Lacher and Dennis Kumetat, “The security of energy infrastructure and 
supply in North Africa and renewable energies in comparative perspective”, Energy 
Policy 39, (2011): 4466.  
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Map 1: Gas pipelines connecting two shores of the Mediterranean56 
  
56 Natural Gas Europe, “Spanish firm buys stake in Medgaz Pipeline,” Available at: 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/spanish-firm-buys-stake-in-medgaz-pipeline  
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2.2.4. Political problems – the Arab uprisings 
 
The West was inclined to interpret the Arab uprisings with the transformations 
of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing these parallels is also the result of the 
hope of eventual democratization of the Arab countries in the Western sense. At the 
beginning the EU was surprised with the events that have unfolded and it had 
inconsistent reactions. The initial response ranged from military intervention in Libya, 
support for Egypt’s regime change, to the acknowledgement of the crackdown in 
Bahrain.57   Due to the Eurozone financial crisis and threat perception the EU hesitated 
to contribute to the transformations through market access, money and mobility. This 
hesitation has also shown its lack of efficient crisis management and conflict prevention 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, the energy importer countries were very much interested in 
what was going on in this region. Although the toppling of the authoritarian regimes is 
in the favor a ‘normative power’ like the EU, due to the policies of the UfM explained 
in the previous section, the EU was not prepared for such a change. After the initial 
hesitant attitude, the EU’s approach to the uprisings was again based on its toolbox, 
rather than on the nature of the existing challenges. 58  The lack of strategy and 
instrument-led manner has again alienated this region at different levels. In addition, the 
protectionist barriers were not lifted nor were the quotas for immigrant workers were 
increased which has damaged the EU’s credibility dearly. Hence, on one side the 
countries are reluctant to cooperate with the EU with regards to the energy sector and on 
the other side the EU still wants to wait and see the results of the uprisings before 
investing there.  
 
Over the last two years the Arab Spring has lead to new tensions, one of them 
being the Syrian civil war. Although it seems like the citizens of Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya are in favor of democracy, the possibility of change is still unsure. Considering 
the instances in the relevant countries since 2011, the persistence of military 
57 Daniel Byman, “Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring,” The Journal 
of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 289. 
 
58 Pol Morillas and Eduard Soler i Lecha, “The EU and the Arab Spring, One Year 
After: A View from the North,“ EuroMeSCo Brief 39, (2012) Available at: 
http://www.euromesco.net/images/briefs/euromescobrief39.pdf  
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dictatorships and Islamist parties is evident. This means the EU has even more 
challenges to deal with when getting involved in this region. As stated by Fischer, 
democracy is a demand that has to come from within the society and not from external 
forces.59 The USA has turned its attention to East Asia and cannot afford playing the 
‘policeman’ of the region anymore, while the EU cannot play the game at all.60  The 
rise of BRICS disturbs the balance constructed in the 20th century and the ‘Western’ 
powers most certainly lose their geopolitical power. Thus, the Southern Mediterranean 
region has become an empty chessboard where the players will be determined from 
scratch. Although the EU has its plate full with the financial problems of PIIGS, this is a 
good opportunity to be an effective actor in this region. The full cooperation of all 
Member States will help them to overcome the economic stagnation, as many 
investment and energy cooperation opportunities are available in this region. For 
instance, the EU has advanced solar energy technology that can be imported and benefit 
the both sides. But admittedly, this is still a region plighted by conflict and cooperation 
is not an easy task. The success of the new regimes in carrying on the previous regimes’ 
promises and meeting the demands of the society are still unpredictable. With such 
uncertainties, proceeding with the project-driven approach as defined in the UfM will 
be a wise option for the EU. The next chapter gives an analysis of the attempts of the 
EU to form regional collaboration with this region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Joschka Fischer “The Mediterranean crucible. Project Syndicate,” Project Syndicate 
(January 28, 2011) Available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-
mediterranean-crucible  
 
60 Laris Gaiser and Dejan Hribar, “Euro – Mediterranean Region: Resurged Geopolitical 
Importance,” International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies. 5:57 (2012) p. 63.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Analysis of the EU – North Africa Relations 
 
 
The first part of this chapter gives a brief insight on the Europe – Arab world 
relations with a specific focus on Northern African countries. Starting with historic 
background information, several attempts to establish a regional cooperation between 
the EU and the Maghreb countries are delineated. The developments after the Arab 
Spring are also expounded, in order to understand the energy relations that will be 
discussed in the coming sections. In the second part of this chapter the Northern African 
countries’ energy projects and RES outlook are discussed to be able to proceed to the 
next chapter, which examines the problems related to these issues.  
 
Europe’s relations with the Arab world have developed on two axes: a guilt 
complex and a superiority complex.61 France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain 
were the colonizers of the Mediterranean in the last century paving way to these two 
complexes. On the one hand, having exploited and dominated these countries 
constituted a burden to the European colonizers and made them feel guilty and 
protectionist. On the other hand, as the ‘Orientalism’ literature has alleged, the ‘West’ 
has viewed the ‘East’ as politically, socially and economically backwards. Hence the 
fusion of these two axes has been orienting the modernization efforts of these former 
colonizers. Since the 1960s, several projects attempted to Europeanize the governance, 
industry and judicial system. It can be argued that the Western world has been 
promoting these reforms to be able to keep the regimes loyal and ensure their power 
supplies. However, the Arab Spring has interrupted this support system as the ever-
61 Andreu Bassols, “Europe and the Arab (R)evolutions,” IEMed Mediterranean 
Yearbook Med 2012 p. 70.  
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lasting regimes have been toppled one-by-one. After a relatively long period the 
Mediterranean basin is again in a state of flux that may change the face of the region 
forever. The authoritarian regimes have broken the routine and wiped out the leaders 
who were in power for the last few decades. The EU leaders were confused and looked 
for ways to keep their position in this region by implicit dominance via trade relations. 
More than three quarters of MENA exports go to the EU while only 5.6 percent of the 
EU’s exports goes to Southern Mediterranean countries. 62  For instance, Tunisia is 
heavily dependent on the EU as three-quarters of its exports goes there, Algeria is 
exporting half of its hydrocarbons to the EU and Libya’s trade relations too have been 
on the rise since the end of its international isolation in 2011.63 In all these countries 
France is the dominant bilateral donor and some other EU countries have also raised 
their share after the Arab Spring.64 However, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has 
been shifting from revolutionary Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to Morocco and Algeria, 
which are more stable.65 Hence, with these three sets of data, one can deduce that the 
EU continues with its ‘business as usual’ approach, seem, to be lying in keeping its 
economically beneficial ties despite the changes in regimes that still can be considered 
authoritarian. Since Algeria, Libya and Egypt are significant energy suppliers to the EU 
the dependency is also not easy to be ruled out. It can be expected that the trade 
relations will continue to flourish considering the EU’s increasing demand for energy. 
The specifics of the energy outlook of the Mediterranean area are given in the next 
section, before that the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean relations will be dealt with.  
 
 
 
62 European Commission, “EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,” Available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113421.pdf  
 
63 Kristina Kausch, “The End of the (Southern) Neighborhood,” Papers IEMed 18 
(2013): 14 – 15. 
 
64 Index Mundi, “Net ODA received,” Available at: 
http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/DT.ODA.ODAT.XP.ZS/compare?country
=tn#country=dz:eg:iq:jo:ly:ma:sy:tn  
 
65 The World Bank, “Foreign direct investment, net inflows,” Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD  
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3.1 Relations Between the EU – Southern Mediterranean Countries 
 
The Mediterranean Sea is a natural boundary between the EU and the Northern 
African countries. As mentioned in the historical background section this boundary has 
enabled the EU to have relations with the southern Mediterranean countries as suits 
itself. Although the two axes of their relationship were economics and security the 
emphasis shifted from one to the other depending on the EU’s preference and the trends 
around the world. It can be alleged that Cold War security concerns have molded their 
collaboration, while in the 1990s due to several attempts like ENP, UfM and Barcelona 
Process prioritized the economic aspect. After 9/11 and the Arab Spring of 2011, 
security issues again came to prominence. Before the whole process is discussed it 
should be mentioned that the Euro – Mediterranean integration process has been 
relatively successful. However, the conflicts among the partners, and lasting 
antagonisms, have hindered further collaboration in political and economic areas. The 
early attempts started with the creation of European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the prioritization of a common foreign policy. The member states proposed The Global 
Mediterranean Policy (1972), the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (1990) and the Euro-
Mediterranean Policy (1995), all emphasizing the need to establish a common ground to 
deal with Mediterranean non-members. 66  However, the truly institutionalized 
cooperation between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries started in the second 
half of  the 1990s, with the Barcelona Process and the UfM that will be expanded upon 
next. 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the EU and especially the former colonizers were 
trying to re-gain their influence. An early attempt was the Barcelona Conference of 
1995, which was held with the participation of 15 EU member states and 12 
Mediterranean partners that signed the Barcelona Declaration in the end. This was the 
beginning of a comprehensive partnership via political dialogue, economic and financial 
66 Federica Bicchi, “The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no.1 (2011): 3. 
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collaboration. 67  There were three ‘baskets’ for the EuroMed cooperation: political, 
economic, and cultural which evolved via several institutions. Annual ministerial 
conferences, the EuroMed committee, the European Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly and EuroMed Civil Forum are examples of such institutions created in the 
process.68 However, these practices have not fulfilled ambitious goals like construction 
of a zone of peace, prosperity, and stability in the Mediterranean. Thus, the EU officials 
came up with European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM). Bicchi describes this evolution as shifting a from “regionalism + politicization 
in the EMP, to bilateralism + functionalism with the ENP, to bilateralism + 
politicization in the UfM.” 69   Especially with the UfM’s firm stand in the 
regionalization process could be achieved. This initiative has defined six priority 
projects: 1) the de-pollution of the Mediterranean; 2) maritime and land highways; 3) 
civil protection; 4) alternative energies and Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP); 5) higher 
education and research; and 6) supporting business. Clearly, the EU trusts its 
community-building afford and replicates its model in its neighbors. In this thesis the 
economic benefits of the Barcelona Process and UfM via energy trade between the 
Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean is elaborated upon. Subsequently 
the next section is about the evolution of this relationship.  
 
The EU has been growing economically and in population wise since its 
establishment.70 This growth rate has naturally triggered rise in energy demand rise. 
However, as a union that is considered as a model for many other organizations the 
demand rise was to be met in an environmentally friendly way. The 2050 goals were 
67 Paul James Cardwell, “EuroMed, European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for 
Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the 
Mediterranean,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no.2 (2011): 225. 
 
68 Ibid. 
 
69 Federica Bicchi, ‘The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations’ Mediterranean Politics 16, no.1 (2011): 5. 
 
70 Detailed statistics on GDP and population growth can be accessed via: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/introduction and 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/introduction  
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just one of the many ways for the EU to achieve sustainable and ecologically 
responsible growth. The aims are as follows: 
  
1. Diversification of primary energy sources by introducing renewable 
sources of energy to the electricity mix.  
2. Increasing energy efficiency and enhancing load management.  
3. Increasing the use of renewable energy sources from 20 percent in 
2000 to 80 percent in 2050, of which 65 percent will be domestic and 15 
percent will be imported solar energy from MENA.  
4. As a consequence of such a transition, conventional base load plants 
running most time at constant capacity will subsequently disappear, 
while the need for conventional balancing power capacity at low annual 
full load hours (less than 2000 h/yr) will increase. Nuclear plants will 
phase out because their economic performance will not be competitive 
under such conditions.  
5. Introducing high voltage direct current (HVDC) power lines for solar 
electricity imports, interconnecting 11 potential sites for CSP production 
in 7 countries in MENA with 22 centers of electricity demand in 16 
countries in Europe.71 
 
As seen from the 5 points above the EU wants to diversify its energy supplies 
which is the key to secure the flow. In the past its dependency on Russian natural gas 
has caused disruptions. For instance in 2006, Russia has used its ‘energy weapon’ to 
punish Ukraine for its pro-Western stance.72 This incident has affected the EU directly 
as Ukraine is the transit country for the Russian natural gas. Anxiety of being over-
dependent on a single country has surfaced and the effort to find alternative routes in 
the south has accelerated. Meanwhile, together with increasing the number of exporter 
countries, the EU aimed to diversify its energy mix by raising the share of RES. 
Particularly after the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011; increased emphasis has been 
placed on the need for cleaner and less dangerous energy resources.73 The southern 
Mediterranean countries became a reliable alternative due to their geographical 
71 Franz Trieb et. al. “Solar electricity imports from the Middle East and North Africa to 
Europe,” Energy Policy  42, (2012) :  342. 
 
72 Valentina Feklyunina, “Russia’s International Images and its Energy Policy: An 
Unreliable Supplier?” in Europe-Asia Studies 64, no. 3 (2012): 453. 
 
73 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remarking of the Modern World. 
(London: Allen Lane, 2011) p.2. 
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proximity and renewable energy potentials. The EU expands its energy ties with this 
region both for fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. Thus, it has expedited the 
promotion of energy infrastructure and electricity grids in the Mediterranean region. 
This progress also conforms with the EU’s Energy 2020 Strategy prioritizing 
partnerships for secure flow of energy and improvements regarding the access to 
sustainable energy.74 This policy also seeks to boost investments in the efficient and 
low-carbon energy technologies that eventually may lead to the Europeanization of this 
energy market. In that vein on March 2011, the EC has issued the ‘Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ stating the 
strategic significance of the South Mediterranean both in terms of access to resources 
and partnership in the production and management of RES.75 In the same year an ‘EU-
Southern Mediterranean Energy Community’ that would start with Maghreb states and 
expand to the Mashreq was announced by the EC. These developments clearly indicate 
the seriousness of the EU in its quest for a long-term collaboration with this region. This 
discussion is summarized in Figure 1. Although it is from 2006, the EU is clearly 
approaching its 20% renewables target. It seems that coal will preserve its share due to 
the American Renaissance and imports of cheap coal from the US. In North Africa, gas 
seems to dominate and the share of renewables remains low. This picture is to be altered 
via closer collaboration with the EU and among the states of North Africa. The EU as 
known today, has started as the Coal and Steel Community and become a tightly knit 
unity; the same may apply to this region as well. Before analyzing the EU – Southern 
Mediterranean cooperation the energy outlook of the Northern African countries is 
provided in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Observatoire Mediterraneen de L’Energie, Mediterranean Energy Perspective 2011, 
(OME: Nanterre, 2011), p.65. 
 
75 European Commission, “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011),” Available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf. 
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Figure 1: Electricity mix of European (EU27) and the five North African 
countries76 
 
 
 
3.2 The EU – North Africa Energy Cooperation 
 
In this section an overview of the energy cooperation between the EU and the 
Maghreb countries is given. Firstly, the question of why the EU has been interested in 
this particular region is discussed before proceeding with the deliberation of previous 
attempts to establish this cooperation. After that a detailed analysis of the energy 
collaborations under the EMP, ENP, Barcelona Process and UfM is given. To conclude 
this section and chapter some scenarios and future projects will be discussed.  
 
The Euro-Mediterranean energy collaboration started with the EU’s effort to 
promote its market norms to its neighbors in 1995. It has chosen this market-based 
effort for three reasons. Firstly, it was seen as an exercise of the projection of the 
constituent norms. Secondly, these efforts have proved to give the EU companies 
greater access in tertiary producer countries. Lastly, a foreign policy on which the whole 
Member States can agree upon could be realized via such initiatives.77 It can be alleged 
76 The power system sizes were 3300 TWh/a and 180 TWh/a respectively (2006). 
Eurostat. Energy and Transport in Figures. Statistical Pocketbook 2009: European 
Commission; 2009. International Energy Agency (IEA). Statistics by country and 
region. 2009; http://iea.org/Textbase/stats/index.asp. 
 
77 Hakim Darbouche, “Energy Issues and the Prospects of the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan,” EUROMED  15 (2008): 132.  
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that the efforts have lead to institutionalized enterprises under the EuroMed and ENP. 
However on the flip side of the coin the southern Mediterranean countries did not 
perceive these policies with great enthusiasm. They saw the efforts as narrow and 
driven by norms and regulations that lack a strategic approach. The countries have also 
realized that the EU Member States were not fully committed to the market norms they 
were exporting. For instance when the issue of unbundling the vertically integrated 
energy companies came up, the Member States could not agree.78 Although there are 
some shortcomings, the EU values its relations with this region. It is vitally significant 
for energy security, particularly as the fossil fuels of Algeria and Libya, which have 4.5 
percent of world’s oil and 4.4 percent of world’s gas reserves respectively, binds the EU 
to this region.79 This foreign reserves dependency seems to grow; by 2030 about 50 
percent of oil and 94 percent of natural gas will be imported.80 Taking into account the 
long-term contracts to deliver gas, policy initiatives, and funded integration projects, the 
EU’s commitment to this region can be seen clearly. For the energy importer countries 
like Tunisia and Morocco, electricity delivery from the EU is crucial. The Union for the 
Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) grid was built in 1997 between 
Spain and Morocco and has the capacity of 400 kV. In 2005 it concluded and all 
operational tasks were transferred to ENTSO-E that meets around 500 million people’s 
electricity demand. 81  This expansion had limited effect on Libya and Egypt; they 
remain isolated due to their geographical location. This was the general outlook of the 
EU – Maghreb relations, now a detailed analysis of the institutionalization attempts will 
be given.   
 
 
78 Ibid. 
 
79 Roberto F. Aguilera, “Assessing oil resources in the Middle East and North Africa,” 
OPEC Energy Review 1, (2009): 53. 
 
80 Gawdat Bahgat, “Europe’s energy security: challenges and opportunities,” 
International Affairs. 82, no. 5 (2006) 
 
81 ENTSO-E, “Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity,” 
Available at: https://www.entsoe.eu/index.php?id=102  
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3.2.1. Euro – Mediterranean partnership and European neighborhood policy   
 
Earlier attempts to establish a Euro – Mediterranean energy cooperation include 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Global Mediterranean policy, which were introduced in 
1970s. Their aim was to respond to the oil crisis but failed to achieve any tangible 
outcomes due to the EC’s institutional shortcomings.82 As a result, until 1990s there 
were no significant attempts for further cooperation between the two shores. It was not 
until the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) project (conception phase 1993 – 95) 
that institutionalized energy collaboration was realized.83 For the first time all the EU 
Member States and 12 Mediterranean countries84 were brought together. The primary 
purpose was to make the states aware of the existing opportunities in their neighboring 
countries. On the EU’s side, it was also crucial to direct its external resources that were 
dedicated to the Central and Eastern European countries back to this region. The first 
foreign ministerial conference was held in Barcelona in 1995 and three main areas of 
cooperation were decided upon: 
 
• a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a          
common area of peace and stability; 
  • an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of 
shared prosperity; 
 • a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote 
understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.85 
 
 
There were political, economic and sociocultural sides of this declaration, and 
the pivotal role of energy in the enhancement of this partnership was emphasized. 
Although it was stated in the declaration, energy collaboration was not an immediate 
82 Hakim Darbouche, “Third Time Lucky? Euro-Mediterranean Energy Cooperation 
under the Union for the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 1 (2011): 194.  
 
83 Ibid. 195.  
 
84 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestine 
Authority, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. 
85 Esther Barbé, “The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process,” 
Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (1996): 32.  
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objective. Security, migration, the Middle East peace process and political reform were 
the prioritized issues.86 The relatively stable situation of the petroleum market has also 
caused this lack of attention. Nevertheless, the region’s hydrocarbon potential and 
location as a transit point for the supplies of Gulf and the Caucasus have given it some 
nominal recognition. Moreover, the states have realized that they are on the same boat 
and will face common challenges, which requires some coordinated action. Peace, 
stability and prosperity could only be achieved if there is dialogue, cooperation and 
exchange of ideas.  
 
Following this declaration the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum (EMEF) has 
been formed and its main task was defined as the facilitation of energy regulation 
reforms and preparation of legislative frameworks for the Mediterranean partners.87 
Three action plans covering the periods of 1998 – 2002, 2003 – 06, and 2008 – 13 have 
been adopted since EMEF’s establishment in 1997. Although there were slight 
differences in the objectives, convergence of energy policies between the two shores of 
the Mediterranean, integration of the energy markets, and competition among the 
members were achieved. European Commission has allocated €55 million to contribute 
to the realization of these goals.88 Although such financial and institutional supports 
existed previously, the energy cooperation framework did not progressed as expected. 
More weight was given to the Middle East peace process and ratification of association 
agreements, while areas like transport, water and telecommunication also took 
precedence. 89  Thus, in time the EMP’s energy dimension was taken over by the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).  
 
86 Oliver Schlumberger, “The UfM and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations,” 
Mediterranean Politics 16, no.1 (2011): 147. 
 
87 Hakim Darbouche, “Third Time Lucky? Euro-Mediterranean Energy Cooperation 
under the Union for the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 1 (2011): 196.  
88 European Commission, “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: EuropeAid,” Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-
cooperation/documents/infonotes_enpisouth_regional_cooperation_en.pdf  
 
89 Hakim Darbouche, “Third Time Lucky? Euro-Mediterranean Energy Cooperation 
under the Union for the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 1 (2011): 199.  
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The launch of the ENP coincides with the Commission’s announcement of 
Green Paper of 2000 focusing on the energy security.90 The exponential rise of oil 
prices in 2000s and the deteriorating relations between the EU and Russia were 
indicators of the shifting geopolitics of energy markets. The need of a post-enlargement 
policy aiming at re-organization of relations with new neighbors became inevitable. 
With this new policy declaration the EU wanted to construct a wider energy community 
bound by common regulations comprising of trade, transit and environmental rules.91 It 
can be argued that energy security has been assured via the EU’s market-based 
provisions. As mentioned by the Commissioner Ferrero – Waldner the ‘ENP energy 
treaty’ linked various geographical regions to unite under the same purpose of securing 
the energy supply.92 Several action plans were put into force to support energy networks 
and interlinks between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Besides the regulatory 
efforts, identification and corroboration of strategic infrastructure, like LNG terminals, 
gas pipelines and electricity grids were also put into effect. Commission’s Green Paper 
of 2006 added new energy policy measures due to the flaming controversies between 
Russia and its CIS neighbors. These new energy packages aimed at empowering the 
energy relations with the southern Mediterranean exporters and transit countries, while 
also supporting new gas supply routes.93 In this way Algeria, Egypt and Libya became 
strategic energy partners that now constitute reliable alternatives to Russia. For these 
countries, energy partnership is also seen as a springboard for future strategic 
cooperation. An overall assessment of the ENP is insufficient and limited. Algeria and 
90 European Commission, “Green paper: towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply,” Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-
supply/doc/green_paper_energy_supply_en.pdf  
 
91 European Commission, “An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests: paper 
from the Commission/SG/HR to the European Council,” Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/90082.pd
f 
 
92 Richard Youngs, Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge (London: 
Routledge, 2009) p.24. 
 
93 European Commission, “Green paper: a European strategy for sustainable, secure and 
competitive energy,” Available at: 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf  
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Libya, the two most important suppliers of the south, have refused to take part in this 
policy. Thus only some normative and infrastructural objectives could be implemented. 
They were skeptical because of the EU’s market-based approach that did not provide 
any reform in their energy sector. The failure to settle the dispute between Algeria’s 
Sonatrach that wanted to operate in a transparent market and Spain’s political and 
industrial authorities has shaken the confidence even further.94 This is just one example 
of many that caused the distrust by EU-led policies like the EMP and the ENP. In the 
next section UfM’s innovations and efforts to change this situation is discussed.  
 
3.2.2. Union for the Mediterranean 
 
Former French president Sarkozy launched the initial idea for the Mediterranean 
Union (later the Union for the Mediterranean) during his 2007 electoral campaign. This 
was seen as a challenge to the existing two initiatives: the EMP and the ENP. As 
distinct from them, the UfM was driven by domestic politics and national foreign policy 
priorities.95 In addition, the dialogue between the two shores was enhanced via stronger 
intergovernmental institutions and a shared Secretariat.96 Despite some of the better 
features, the UfM was still dominated by intergovernmental politics where nation states 
were at the center and the multilateral institutions did not get their deserved places at 
the table. Thus, the previous frameworks could not be replaced and the same policies 
were reinforced again. Looking from the energy perspective, Sarkozy’s vision was to 
support the Franco-Algerian gas cooperation that may become a chief force behind the 
Union, as was the case for the German-Franco cooperation in 1950s.97 However, soon 
94 Lesile Crawford and Andrew England, “Spanish gas groups fear reliance on Algeria,” 
Financial Times, May 12, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/190b0332-1fb2-11dd-9216-
000077b07658.html#axzz2mcDqRWRO  
 
95 Rosa Balfour, “The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean,” 
Mediterranean Politics 14, no.1 (2009): 99. 
 
96 Ibid. 100.  
 
97 David Gauthier-Villars, “Sarkozy seeks to pair French, Algerian natural-gas firms,” 
The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2007. Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118307740273352310  
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this idea proved to be wrong and the Sonatrach – Gaz de France (GDF) partnership 
remained limited. It can be argued that the mistrust caused by the EMP and ENP 
continued. After the two relatively fruitless attempts, the focus on more concrete 
projects, especially in the energy field, was a good choice the boost the frozen relations.  
 
The UfM paved the way to more concrete projects and more tangible relations 
between the two shores of the Mediterranean. On July 13, 2008 the members identified 
six priority projects and the foreign ministers ratified them few months later. The de-
pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land high ways, civil protection, higher 
education and research, small and medium-sized business development and the push for 
RES were the accepted projects. 98  Additionally, enhancement of solar energy was 
emphasized and the Mediterranean Solar Plan became the catalysis to enhance Euro – 
Mediterranean energy cooperation. This project has been the ‘flagship’ surpassing all 
other projects since 2008 and a detailed analysis of the MSP will be given in chapter 
four. In general the aim was to reach a capacity of 20 gigawatts/year by 2020 and create 
a ‘Euro-Mediterranean green electricity market’. 99  Although the renewable energy 
potential of this region has been known for a while, it took years to establish a new form 
of trade to utilize it. The reason behind this was the overdependence on Russia’s natural 
gas exports that became one of the main primary energy resources. This preference has 
also detracted the EU away from its energy supply diversification policy. With the 
implementation of these solar plans the EU also looks after the host countries’ welfare. 
Employment opportunities, technology transfer and meeting the growing domestic 
energy requirements are just some of the ways development is ensured. DESERTEC 
Initiative is a twin project that shares the same aspirations and aims to raise $400 billion 
to meet up to 15 percent of Europe’s electricity needs by 2050.100 Although both were 
 
98 Union for the Mediterranean, “Projects,” Available at: 
http://ufmsecretariat.org/projects/  
 
99 Hakim Darbouche, “Third Time Lucky? Euro-Mediterranean Energy Cooperation 
under the Union for the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 1 (2011): 203. 
 
100 Franz Trieb et. al. “Solar electricity imports from the Middle East and North Africa 
to Europe,” Energy Policy  42 (2012):  350. 
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expected to start by 2012, today they still remain as ‘desert dreams’. The reasons for 
this flaw are elaborated on in the next chapter, subsequent to a brief appraisal of the 
UfM is provided. 
 
The effects of the UfM on the economies and technological advancement of the 
Southern Mediterranean countries have been and will be discussed later, but for now 
some possible political consequences are considered. The UfM was criticized for its 
tendency to exclude societal voices and re-governmentalization of relations. Hence, in a 
sense the Arab states became veto-players whose authoritarian regimes are supported. 
Since most of them are developing, middle-income countries that experience economic 
stagnation, the governments can maintain their authoritarian stances.101 However, one 
would expect the EU to export its political norms and values like democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law. But this has not been the case so far. Maybe the EU did not 
want to ruin its repetition as the antidote to the US’s Middle Eastern policies, which are 
considered as insensitive to the peculiarities of this region.102 In addition, the Arab 
countries have also benefited from the EMP and ENP individually; they have room to 
use the funds for civil society programs. However, it would be a delusion to expect the 
UfM to transform the Euro-Mediterranean relations altogether. So it is useful to discuss 
two possible scenarios defined by Schlumberger:  the ‘Schuman – Sarkozy Scenario’ 
and the ‘Realistic Scenario’. The first one regards the French ‘union of projects’ 
approach based on Jean Monnet’s functionalist method.  It argues that first, some 
primary links are created which evolve and result in deeper integration.103 The flaw of 
this scenario is that there is an ongoing conflict and mistrust among the Arab countries, 
preventing political integration. However, considering the beginning of the EU as 
known today, the level of confidence between Germany and France after the World War 
101 Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world,” Saban Center 
Analysis Paper 13, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution). Available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/10arabworld.aspx  
 
102 Oliver Schlumberger, “The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean 
and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no.1 (2011): 137.  
 
103 Cris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. (New 
York: Routledge, 2000) p. 24.  
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II was also not high. Hence, it cannot be foreseen that the collaboration in some areas 
with shared interests may over time lead to widening spheres of cooperation and deeper 
integration with the EU. The second scenario is pessimistic about the political 
integration and argues that the EU would value its material interests over a normative 
vision.104 Strengthening the Arab states as veto-players give the opportunity to block 
any initiatives that are politically unwelcome. Furthermore, the insistence on energy 
projects is also de-politicizing the cooperation. It is safe to say the alteration of 
undemocratic political regimes is not on the EU agenda any longer. The next section 
discusses the Arab Spring’s effect and possible consequences for the political regimes 
in the Northern Africa, which altered its relations with the EU.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 Oliver Schlumberger, “The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean 
and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no.1 (2011): 146.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Barriers to the Integration with the EU 
 
 
In the previous chapter, several attempts of the EU to integrate the North 
African region were described. Since the 1990s both shores have been focused in the 
process of greater regional interaction. Clearly, none of them were fully successful in 
either realizing the North-South or South-South integration. In this section, a theoretical 
explanation is provided for the lack of integration by handling EMP, ENP and UfM 
one-by-one. Barbé and Surrallés propose four models of region- building used by the 
EU to mold their integration with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries 
(SEMCs): EU-based community-building, multilateral partnership-building, 
differentiated integration, and á la carte cooperation. 105  They are differentiated 
according to two variables: polarity and the scope or rationale of the collaboration. 
Polarity suggests whether or not the relations are EU-centered, while the scope or 
rationale signifies whether the integration is more holistic / normative or sectorial / 
functional.106 The EU-based community building, as the name suggests, is centered and 
normative which leaves little room for differentiation. The multilateral approach is non-
centered but still normative since geographical differentiation is curbed. Differentiated 
integration is centered and functional, although the convergence with the EU norms is 
targeted this can happen in varied paces depending on the policy area and country. 
Lastly, the á la carte cooperation welcomes various types of differentiation, hence it is 
105 Ester Barbé and Anna Herranz Surrallés, “Dynamics of Convergence and 
Differentiation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Towards Flexible Region-Building or 
Fragmentation?” Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 2 (2010): 131. 
 
106 Ibid. 
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non-centered and functional. 107  After establishing the theoretical framework, EMP, 
ENP and UfM’s categorization will be conducted accordingly.  
 
The EMP was the first attempt to establish a Euro-Mediterranean ‘region’ by 
promoting economic, political, and social collaboration. It is holistic in manner and 
normative in rationale. As seen clearly in the Barcelona Declaration, economic and 
financial domains were prioritized and an institutional framework was given for the 
political and security issues.108  The EU’s top-down approach via an intergovernmental 
agenda aimed at the emergence of a shared identity. As the project proceeded, it became 
obvious that the tendency towards EU-centeredness was rising due to the European 
Commission’s role as the policy setter. Hence, EMP has deviated from its initial setting 
as a partnership to a hierarchical scheme. The deteriorated relations of Arabs and 
Israelis paralyzed the whole process and region-side integration was not realized. A less 
holistic approach was taken with the ENP. Although it was again EU-centered, this time 
gradual integration of its southern ‘neighbors’ in a number of policy areas was the aim. 
EU acquis were the framework of the domestic reforms that had some sectorial and 
geographical flexibility.109  There was also the change from the multilateral approach of 
the EMP to a bilateral ENP, which was better at meeting the partners’ preferences. In 
addition, scholars like Zukrowska and Pace emphasized the functional and flexible 
nature that did not give precedence to a shared identity.110 This approach suffered from 
107 Alexander C-G. Stubb, “A categorization of differentiated integration,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 13, no.2 (1996): 291.  
 
108 Stephen Calleya, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: 
Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Boston, MA: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1997) p.65. 
 
109 Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, “Normative power: the European practice of 
region-building and the case of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, in: E. Adler, F. 
Bicchi, B. Crawford & R. A. Del Sarto (Eds) The Convergence of Civilizations: 
Constructing a Mediterranean Region (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) p.4. 
 
110 Michelle Pace, “Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: The EU as a norm entrepreneur in 
the south,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20, no.4 (2007): 672. & 
Katarzyna Zukrowska et al. “Building Euro-Med free trade agreement: how to improve 
the bilateral management strategies?” Go-Euromed Working Paper 0804 (2008) p.25. 
Available at : http://www.goeuromed.org  
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the lack of a clear leadership pushing forward the process and no clear direction for the 
reforms. Lastly, the UfM was launched on the 10th anniversary of Barcelona Process 
and emphasized the need for project-based approach. Hence, it fits into the à la carte 
type of collaboration, not all partners had to take part in every project. This tactic is in 
line with Mitrany’s functionalist theory of regional cooperation that advocates for the 
stepwise sectorial collaboration as the way forward when there are political 
disagreements.111 Although some scholars favored this approach, others stressed the 
Arab-Israel conflict that would surface every time there is an attempt for further 
cooperation. One should admit that after the pro-reform and political integration based 
EMP and ENP, UfM’s pragmatic attitude is quite a radical change. As of today, the 
UfM has also not lead to deeper regionalism; hence the EU has still not found a 
functional scheme to achieve accelerated integration. Some solutions based on that 
assumptions are discussed in the next chapter.   
 
The discussion now turns back to the energy cooperation, especially after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union energy became a key issue in the Euro – Mediterranean 
relations. As mentioned before, the EU tried to both diversify its suppliers and increase 
the share of renewable energies in its energy mix. Disappointments caused by natural 
gas disruptions and China’s increasing dominance over Central Asian resources makes 
the North African countries the best candidates for deepening energy collaboration. The 
technologically advanced north and fossil fuels rich south constitute a perfect match. 
Since most of the hydrocarbon potential is exploited and traded with the EU, the 
technological investment and construction of infrastructure to transmit the electricity 
became vital issues. The previous paragraph has indicated that the EU tried to converge 
on the basis of its acquis communautaire even if it concerns the energy issue. A Euro-
Mediterranean energy partnership based on EU regulations may not be the best option 
to push forward this cooperation. In other words, the EU’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
did not result in fruitful collaboration all the time. Hence, in the next section, two of the 
barriers for further integration are given.  
 
 
 
111 David A. Mitrany, Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1943) p.79.  
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4.1 Financial 
 
The first barrier is caused by a lack of financial resources to dedicate to the 
development of renewables and construction of electricity grids. Although feed-in 
tariffs and tax incentives are provided, these are not enough to build any large-scale 
renewable energy plants.112 Hence the creation of an institution to finance the projects 
of the UfM on a regular basis has been negotiated. The three options on the table were 
the establishment of an ex nihilo bank with a significant capital base; a Euro-
Mediterranean Bank based on the existing structure; and the creation of a Mediterranean 
public fund.113 The Commission favored the second option since it would support the 
private sector, give access to the SMEs to bank credits, encourage financial markets and 
transfer technology via long-term funds. However the uncertainties surrounding the 
UfM and the need for large amounts of funds have disrupted this process. The European 
Investment Bank (EIB) estimates the total amount of investments in the southern and 
eastern Mediterranean to be around €21 billion by 2020 and majority would go to solar 
energy technology.114 It has been a dream to make use of the solar radiation in the 
Saharan Desert to meet the European electricity need. Although Spain and Germany are 
the leaders of solar energy technology in Europe, they are still cautious about investing. 
In addition, there is still not enough demand on the North African side to use the power 
generated by the solar plants. Although the calculations indicate the sun radiation on 
just 1 percent of Earth’s desert surface can meet the demand of the world.115 Since, the 
potential clearly exceeds North Africa’s energy demand and there is the need to transmit 
the energy using electricity grids. The most suitable place to interconnect North Africa 
112 EIB, “Study on the Financing of Renewable Energy Investment in the Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean Region,” Available at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/ 
country/study_msp_en.pdf  
 113 Bicchi, Federica “The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no.1 (2011): 13.  
114 Ibid. 
 
115 Desertec Foundation, Desertec White Book 4th Edition (Bonn: Desertec 2009) p.26. 
World’s one year energy demand can be met if 1 percent of the desert surface is covered 
with PV and it gets 6 hours of sun light. 
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and the EU is Gibraltar that can offer a capacity of 1400000 KW.116 Another option is 
the interconnector between Italy and Tunisia, which would be more expensive than the 
previous project.117 Nevertheless, today the capacity to transmit energy between the two 
continents is limited and it will remain so in the coming years. Considering the financial 
crisis in the EU, it is safe to say that decisions regarding climate change and renewable 
energy policy cannot be taken. Progress in these agendas can be achieved via subsidies 
and market mechanisms that are channeled to fight the crisis. Furthermore, the fall of 
economic growth, demand and conventional energy prices have been delaying the 
investments in renewables and transmission grids. The IEA stated the investment went 
from an increase of 85 percent in 2007 to a fall of 20 percent in 2009.118 The specific 
effects on solar energy initiatives like MSP and DESERTEC are discussed later. Before 
that, several other international initiatives to promote renewable energy are given. 
 
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was launched in 2009 to 
disseminate and endorse renewable energies. Its main activities involve developing new 
synergies, facilitating dialogue and information, and empowering the flow of 
technology and innovation.119 The agency also finances development of local capacities 
and infrastructure. This comprehensive agenda can provide for the needs of the North 
African countries. Another initiative is the International Climate Governance or the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM was established through the Kyoto 
Protocol to support emerging and developing countries’ capacity building and 
116 Spain’s net electricity consumption in 2010 was 267.04 billion KW.  EIA, “Spain: 
Overview,” Last modified: May 30, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=sp   
117 Andrew Janis Folkmanis, “International and European market mechanisms in the 
climate change agenda – An assessment of their potential to trigger investments in the 
Mediterranean solar plan,” Energy Policy 39 (2011): 4490  
 
118 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009. (Paris: IEA-OECD, 
2009) p. 161.  
 
119 IRENA, “Vision and Mission,” Available at: 
http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=cat&PriMenuID=13&CatID=9  
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renewable energy projects.120 Currently there are around 5000 CDM projects that are 
either under valuation or have already started and among 60 percent of them are on 
renewables.121 However, only a few of them are about joint solar energy projects, which 
are small in scale like PV, solar water heating and solar cooking. A lack of 
collaboration between authorities and local companies to prepare projects has been the 
chronic problems of the CDM.122 The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) finances large-
scale projects on long-term green house gas emission savings. It also fosters 
development via co-funding programs, which are embedded in national programs. 
Contribution to the implementation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 
using finances of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) is also a primary focus.123 
These were some of main renewable energy initiatives that have been evolving their 
objectives and focus over the time. However, none of them have the capacity to support 
large-scale renewable energy projects. DESERTEC and MSP are discussed in the case 
studies section, which are considered to be relatively successful, compared to other 
initiatives.  
 
4.2 Regulations and Electricity Market Reforms 
 
 
This section elaborates on another pressing problem: the lack of diverse 
regulatory systems and free electricity market in North African countries. Increased 
regional cooperation and integration with the EU in terms of energy is hindered due to 
this problem. As mentioned in the previous section, the EU put forward several 
multilateral initiatives like Mediterranean Solar Plan, the DESERTEC, Clean 
120 Srikanth Subbarao and Bob Lloyd, “Can the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
deliver?” Energy Policy 39 (2011): 1600.  
 
121 Kerstin Fritzsche, Driss Zejli and Dennis Tänzler, “The relevance of global energy 
governance for Arab countries: The case of Morocco,” Energy Policy 39 (2011) p. 
4503.  
 
122 José Maria Marin Quemada and Gonzalo Escribano, “The Mediterranean Solar Plan 
as a Euro-Mediterranean Vector of Integration and Economic Development,” IEMed 
(2011) p.21. 
 
123 Clean Investment Fund, “Funds & Programs,” Available at: 
https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/2  
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Technology Fund and the directive 2009/28/EC 124 , which offers cooperation 
opportunities, to accelerate the renewable energy market development. The countries in 
this region have very different regulatory and legal systems affecting the renewable 
development and use. To revert this, the EU has already established a common policy 
framework and defined its regulatory regimes. On the other side, the southern 
Mediterranean countries have non-binding targets and underdeveloped institutional 
frameworks. In the recent years, more progress has been achieved on the national level. 
Hence, the countries are examined individually in this section, in terms of the RES 
regulations and electricity market developments, to illustrate the failure of the EU’s 
single approach.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of chapter two, when developing countries have 
vast amounts of hydrocarbons, they perform poorly in other sectors. The widened social 
and economic divisions weaken governance and lead to corruption. The failure of check 
and balance systems causes the reforms in energy institutions to delay. Obviously, the 
lack of an efficient regulatory mechanism is at the root of the problem. Both in the 
national and regional sense the countries lack laws with any sanction power. They 
remain as rules with blurry targets. Hence, the EU and the private sector are hesitant to 
invest in this region before they agree on a common and binding regulatory system. 
Especially the renewable energies sector demands unified regulations if the electricity is 
to be transmitted using the grid system.  Now, some crucial laws and institutions of the 
five North African countries’ to promote the production and use of renewable energies 
are given. This would also indicate how individually oriented the states are and the 
fallacy on the side of the EU to treat them as a single entity.  
 
4.2.1 Algeria 
 
Three main principles have been adopted for the promotion of the renewable 
energy. The first one is to introduce several targets to increase the share of renewables 
124 Especially article 9 paves the way for new investments in renewable electricity 
capacity and infrastructure around the Mediterranean shores. Observatoire 
Mediterraneen de L’Energie, Mediterranean Energy Perspective 2011, (OME: 
Nanterre, 2011) p.193.  
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in the energy mix.125 Moreover, reduction in CO2  emission level by 50 million tons and 
diversification of the energy supply sources are the two other aims of the national 
energy strategy.126 Some laws and regulations governed this policy. The two main laws 
were the No. 04-09 of August 14, 2004 on the promotion of RES in line with the 
framework of sustainable development and No. 02-01 of February 5, 2002 on 
distribution of gas and electricity.127 These initiatives were taken to be able to get the 
feed-in tariffs offered by the EU. But there are still criteria concurring with the 
environmental protection rules, energy efficiency and security of electricity networks, 
before granting the tariffs. In terms of the natural gas issue, the EC launched the ‘Road 
Map accompanying the Association Agreement’ in 2008 including several policy areas 
economic reforms in the fields of trade and energy. Especially in the energy area a long-
term harmonization with the Algerian energy market was aimed. In addition, closer 
cooperation within Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa to boost the energy market was 
proposed.128 Again on the Algerian side, to be able to bring its market closer to the 
international standards, electricity law was enacted in 2002. 129 The gas monopolist 
Sonelgaz unbundled its activities and an independent regulatory body was found. After 
that several projects by IPPs started to take place in the following years. But 
considering the vast hydrocarbon resources and developed trade relations with the EU, 
it will be too optimistic to expect a great leap forward in the RES with the regulations 
that are mentioned above.  
 
125 5 percent by 2015, 15 percent by 2020 and 40 percent by 2030. Ibid. 
 
126 Ministry of Energy and Mining, “Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Program,” Available at: http://www.mem-
algeria.org/francais/uploads/enr/Programme_ENR_et_efficacite_energetique_en.pdf  
 
127 European Commission, “Paving the Way for the MSP: Country Report Algeria”, 
Available at: http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/index.php?option=com_downloads&task=category&cid=7&Itemid=56.  
 
128 Gonzalo Escribano, “Convergence towards Differentiation: The Case of 
Mediterranean Energy Corridors,” Mediterranean Politics, 15, no.2 (2010): 221. 
 
129 Algerian Electricity Law No. 02-01, 2002. Journal officiel de la Republique Algeri- 
enne, no. 13, (February 6, 2002) p.4 
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4.2.2 Egypt 
 
In 2011 Egypt witnessed fundamental political and economic changes with the 
end of the Mubarak regime. Especially the energy sector has been affected as a 
developing sector. Considering its long history as an energy exporter the regulations are 
far too insufficient. In terms of renewables, the New and Renewable Energy Authority 
(NREA) regulates all the activities since it was established in 1986 under the Ministry 
of Electricity and Energy. It coordinates national, regional and international fields by 
the institutional framework for the implementation of renewable energy strategies. 
Promotion and introduction of new technologies; RE tests and certification; project 
evaluation and implementation are all in the jurisdiction of this authority. Currently 
there are no regulations that aim specifically the promotion of the use of RES. For 
instance, wind energy is sold via Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) according to each 
project. Hence, there is lack of support program for the private sector to get involved in 
the construction of large-scale RE plants.130 Although the Supreme Energy Council 
approved the Egyptian Combined Renewable Energy Master Plan in 2010, due to the 
political turmoil not much progress has been achieved yet.131 In terms of natural gas, 
Egypt has become a significant producer and exporter of since the 2000s. The 
government created a Regulatory Agency for Gas and Oil affairs in 2009 in order to 
deregulate the energy sector, encourage competition and accelerate privatization.132 In 
the same year the Energy Efficiency Unit (EEU) was established for strategic planning 
and effective implementation. In addition, collecting and processing information to draft 
policies on energy efficiency were also targeted. 133 As of today, the EEU has not 
130 MEDREC, “Chapter II: Egypt”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2 
 
131 African Development Bank, “Clean Energy Development in Egypt – 2012,” 
Available at: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-
Documents/Cata%20Energie%20Anglais.pdf  
 
132 Sherine Nasr, “Liberalization at a Price Tag,” Al- Ahram, 940 (March 26, 2009) 
Available at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/940/ec1.htm  
 
133 Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers, “The Supreme Council of Energy: The Energy 
Efficiency Unit,” Available at: www.jcee- eg.net/libdetails.asp?typeid=4, 
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dedicated itself fully to the implementation of effective policies to promote energy 
efficiency.134 Electricity markets’ commercial orientation and privatization may proceed 
with the new Electricity Law.135 Like Algeria, the regulatory changes started recently. It 
will take time for the regimes to consolidate and comply both with each other and with 
the EU. However, after the military coup last July, the country is divided between the 
Morsi and Sisi supporters that may make progress in any given sector difficult.  
 
 
4.2.3 Libya 
 
Muammar al-Gadhafi assumed power in 1969 and ran the country according to 
his ideology that was a combination of socialism and Islam. He was accused of using 
the oil revenues to support terrorist activities, leading to sanctions by the UN and the 
EU. Although they were lifted in the beginning of the 2000s, untill then the energy 
regulatory system could not develop.136 Prior to the 2011 revolution, the institutional 
setting did not support long-term sustainable policies. In 2008, the Ministry of 
Electricity and Energy had shifted all its responsibilities to the Energy Council chaired 
by the prime minister. In addition, the Renewable Energy Authority (REAOL) was 
founded in 2007 for managing and planning the introduction of RE.137 However, there 
is still no regulatory agency in the country and no legislation covering the financial 
support for RE. In addition, there is also no legal basis for private investment in the 
energy sector. Since 2008, the Supreme Energy Council has the regulatory role and the 
134African Development Bank,  “Clean Energy Development in Egypt – 2012,” 
Available at: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-
Documents/Cata%20Energie%20Anglais.pdf 
 
135 Gawdat Bahgat, “Egypt’s Energy Outlook: Opportunities and Challenges,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 24, no.1 (2013): 21. 
 
136 CIA, “The World Factbook : Libya,” Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html. Last 
Modified: October 31, 2013. 
 
137 IEA Country Energy Statistics 2009. 
http://www.iea.org/stats/countryresults.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=LY&Submit=Submit  
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following tasks: preparation of policies, development of energy sector structure, 
establishment of a pricing strategy and approval of foreign company contracts.138 After 
the revolution, an energy sector policy could not be formulated, as a result of the lack of 
a coherent government, however Libya has now has the chance to start a new chapter in 
its history through the DESERTEC project. It can be a North African powerhouse with 
its RES potential and strategic location close to the major population centers in the 
Middle East and Europe.139 It is, however, still too early to be hopeful considering again 
the political turmoil and lack of a single regulatory system governing all the North 
African countries. In addition, all the institutions that were established since the 
independence have served Gadhafi and his inner circle, thus a new democratic system is 
required to transform them and facilitate the collaboration with the EU.  
 
4.2.4 Morocco 
 
RES was included in the national policy in 1982 with the establishment of the 
Center for the Development of RES (CDER). Its main tasks were independent power 
generation, RES-based electrification and resource assessment. 140  For instance, the 
Morocco Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) was established for the implementation of 
2000 MW solar projects.141 The government has also put emphasis on empowering the 
legal and regulatory framework to facilitate the progress in RES. However, there were 
many obstacles on the way such as the lack of financial incentives, strategic guidance 
and information for the investors, insufficient experience and communication between 
the ministries. Hence, several legal reforms were implemented to overcome the 
138 Desertec Knowledge Platform, “Libya,” available at: 
http://knowledge.desertec.org/wiki/index.php5/Libya#cite_note-MVV_decon-0   
139 Investment U, “Will A New Libya Usher in the European Energy Revolution?” 
Available at: http://www.investmentu.com/2011/October/the-european-energy-
revolution.html. Last modified: October 25, 2011.  
 
140 MEDREC, “Chapter III: Morocco”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2 
 141 Masen, “Missions,” Available at: http://www.masen.org.ma/index.php?Id=5&lang=en#/   
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problems and develop RES. For instance the decree 1-06-15 of 2006 obligates the 
public institutions to call for tenders to create competition for projects. In 2008 the Law 
16-08 was enacted to support the development of wind energy by raising the ceiling for 
self-generation by industrial sites from 10 MW to 50 MW.142  Recently, the ‘Renewable 
Energy Law’ was enacted (no 13-09) aiming to promote electricity production from 
RES and sale by private or public entities. In addition, all producers were obliged to be 
connected to a national electricity grid. 143  These several attempts accelerated the 
process and today Morocco has the highest development of renewable energies among 
the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). 144  Nevertheless, the large-scale 
technology deployment encounters financial constraints. In addition, at the institutional 
level there are no incentives to promote the RE like feed-in tariffs. In terms of 
transmission of the energy produced, the national electricity grid transmission capacity 
and interconnection is inadequate. This again hinders the integration with the region and 
the EU.  
  
4.2.5 Tunisia 
 
As it is with the countries discussed above, the involvement of private sector in 
the energy production sector has been increasingly in line with the regulatory changes. 
Many amendments were made in the legislative framework for the promotion of energy 
efficiency and RES. In the energy efficiency area, several decrees145 that date back to 
1994 set amounts and criteria of granting the allowance inherent in investments. 
142 European Commission, “Paving the Way for the MSP: Country Report Morocco”, 
Available at: http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/index.php?option=com_downloads&task=category&cid=7&Itemid=56 
 
143 Norton Rose Fulbright, “Renewable energy in Morocco,” Available at: 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/66419/renewable-energy-
in-morocco . Last Modified: May, 2012.  
 
144 Ibid. 
 
145 No 94-537 (March 10, 1994),no 2002-174 (January 28, 2002). Observatoire 
Mediterraneen de L’Energie, Mediterranean Energy Perspective 2011, (OME: 
Nanterre, 2011) p.86.  
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Likewise, in the field of renewables, decrees and laws again set lists of products that are 
crucial for the manufacture of plants in the 1990s.146 Besides these regulatory changes, 
presidential decisions have also introduced some rules. The use of solar water heaters 
was made mandatory for public buildings, the widespread use of PV was a main focus, 
and the share of wind energy in electricity production was to be increased. In addition, 
VAT exemption for energy saving products, allowances for show-case projects and 
investments were some of the tax and financial incentives to boost the development of 
the RES.147 Société Tunisienne de l’Electriccité et du Gaz (STEG) was created in 1962 
and untill 1996 it was the monopole for generation, transmission, distribution of 
electricity. Despite the amendments in the current legislative framework, the produced 
electricity can only be sold by STEG and no private generation is allowed. The 
capacities of generation equipment are not allowed to exceed the border subscribed with 
STEG’s. In terms of electricity grid connection, currently a fifth line (Jendouba-Chefia) 
with Algeria, a double circuit line with Libya is finalized, and with Italy, submarine DC 
cable from El Haouaria to Partanna (Sicily) and two conversion stations will be 
completed by 2016. 148 Among the other North African countries mentioned above, 
Tunisia is making the most progress in the energy field, but still only an overall 
development of the region’s regulatory system will enable the integration with the EU. 
After the discussions of the individual states’ energy regulations and institutions, two of 
the large-scale RE initiatives are elaborated on in the next section. 
 
4.3 Case Studies 
 
The financial and regulatory barriers to the integration with the EU in the RE 
field has been discussed at length. In this section two of the large-scale RE initiatives, 
the MSP and DESERTEC, are elaborated upon. These case studies will enable the 
146 Decree no 95-744 (April 24, 1995), Law no 94-127: articles 88 & 89 (December 26, 
1994) Ibid. 
 
147 MEDREC, “Chapter IV: Tunisia”, Available at: 
http://www.medrec.org/en/download.php?page=2 
 
148 European Commission, “Paving the way for MSP: Country Report Tunisia”, 
Available at: http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/index.php?option=com_downloads&task=category&cid=7&Itemid=56. 
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comprehension of the big picture and the barriers on the EU side. Both projects are 
grounded in the efforts to develop the Euro-Mediterranean energy collaboration. Since 
1995, the EU has promoted its market norms to its southern neighbors. As liberalizing 
the markets leads to greater access of European companies and convergence of policies, 
cooperation in the energy field accelerates. The North African countries have shown 
little enthusiasm regarding the institutionalized initiatives under EuroMed and the ENP. 
These policies were perceived as narrow and lacking practicability. However, the 
UfM’s project based approach has received support from stakeholders of the both sides 
of the shore. Hence the emergence of DESERTEC and the MSP has been welcomed at 
the beginning, but their relationship has been uneasy since they were launched. The fact 
that, they were initiated almost concurrently with similar objectives, raised doubts. 
Germany and France backed DESERTEC and the MSP respectively, which indicated an 
implicit competition between the two. Due to the rising energy demands and need to 
access modern energy production technologies states on the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean were interested in their gains rather than the dispute between the two. 
However, the financial and regulatory problems have damaged the process. In addition, 
the EU’s market-oriented and one-size-fits-all approach has backfired once again. 
Below the details of both initiatives are discussed. 
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4.3.1 DESERTEC 
 
Map 2: Sketch of a possible infrastructure for a sustainable supply of renewable 
power149 
 
 
 
DESERTEC Industries Initiatives (Dii) was launched in 2009 by twelve 
companies. Its main aim was to analyze and develop the economic, technical, political 
and ecological framework to generate environmentally friendly power in the deserts and 
infertile areas of North Africa. Writing business plans and finding the funds for large-
scale solar plants are the two main tasks of the initiative. In addition, the development 
and reinforcement of electricity grids connecting North Africa to the EU are also crucial 
tasks related to its other goals. This ‘super-grid’ construction between the two shores of 
the Mediterranean will connect a major renewable energy source with demand areas. As 
149 Desertec Foundation, “Pictures,” Available at: 
http://www.desertec.org/press/pictures/  
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mentioned before the demand in the Maghreb is not large enough and the EU would 
like to have some returns for its large-scale investments in this region. The target is to 
meet approximately 15 percent (125 GW) of Europe’s electricity demand by 2050. To 
be able to attain this ambitious aim Dii has four main strategies. To start with, effective 
and uniform regulations for investment have to be initiated; this is a very crucial point 
that was discussed in the previous section. Secondly, a long-term plan based on 
guidance and finance of investment must be drafted. Next, to make DESERTEC more 
concrete some initial solar, wind and transmission grid projects have to be put forward. 
Lastly, conducting detailed research on local conditions is essential. Related with the 
last point working teams were structured on the following areas: generation of energy in 
deserts, transportation of electricity to consumption centers, construction of energy 
markets, economic and social development potential for the MENA region. 150   
Although in theory it is a perfect plan to bring together the energy hungry EU and North 
Africa with its great renewable energy potential, in reality financing such a huge project 
is difficult. For instance, the DESERTEC projects estimates € 42,000 million 
investment for CSP plants with 10 GW capacity by 2020 and another €5,000 million for 
two HVDC lines.151 Moreover, last year the two big funders Siemens and Bosch have 
decided to withdraw from the initiative.152 Other negative news came this year: the 
desert solar power partners DESERTEC Foundation and Dii decided to split up. They 
are the two principle supporters of a European renewable energy revolution through a 
vast desert solar generation grid.153 Although both will go on with their own projects, it 
150 Observatoire Mediterraneen de L’Energie, Mediterranean Energy Perspective 2011, 
(OME: Nanterre, 2011) pp. 69 – 70.  
 
151 DLR Institute of Technical Thermodynamics, “Trans-Mediterranean Interconnection 
for Concentrating Solar Power: Final Report,” Available at: 
http://www.dlr.de/tt/en/Portaldata/41/Resources/dokumente/institut/system/projects/TR
ANS-CSP_Full_Report_Final.pdf  
 
152 BBC, “Solar storm as desert plan to power Europe Falters,” Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20357167. Last modified: November 
19, 2012.  
 
153 The Guardian, “Desert solar power partners Desertec Foundation and Dii split up,” 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jul/05/renewable-energy-
desertec-foundation-dii. Last modified: July 5, 2013.  
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surely has damaged the prestige of the project. Hence, DESERTEC has to find new 
funders and supporters in the near future; otherwise energy-hungry countries like China 
may soon enter the North African countries.  
 
 
Figure 2: Climate and Power Supply Security Mix in MENA154 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 The MSP 
 
 
The Mediterranean Solar Plan was launched in 2010 and it was one of the 
priority projects of UfM to accelerate cooperation between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean. The challenges posed by the increasing energy demand, supply security 
and environmental sustainability are the other fields the MSP also addresses. Looking at 
Figure 2, it is no surprise that both project are focusing mainly on solar energy. Hence, 
with this particular emphasize on solar and also wind energies, the objective is to 
154 Solar Server, “Solar Plan (MSP) becomes the flagship project of the Union for the 
Mediterranean,” Available at: 
http://www.solarserver.com/solarmagazin/standpunkt_knees_e.html   
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develop 20 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2020.155 Figure 6 above also indicates 
the growing share of RES in the energy mix. Supplying local markets with the 
electricity produced, improving energy efficiency, creating new industrial capacities and 
fostering regional energy market integration are some of the other goals of the MSP.156 
The launch of this project around the same time created a fuzzy relationship with 
DESERTEC. The similar prospects have generated some doubts as to the implicit 
competition between the MSP and DESERTEC. On the one side, the former colonial 
ruler France, a nuclear power technology producer, looks forward to promote its 
technologies to North Africa with the DESERTEC initiative. On the other side, 
Germany, the renewable energy expert, lobbies for the investments in this region under 
the scope of MSP.157 Hence, the success of each project depends on how well they are 
promoted in the concerned countries. Furthermore, the national sentiments of the states 
shall be considered as well. Some would argue Europe may become the region’s solar 
colonizer and the region itself will become a ‘guinea pig’ for large-scale investments in 
the renewables technology.158 On the EU side, the MSP is characterized primarily as a 
political act aiming at diversification of energy supply. This also complies with the 
EU’s 20-20-20 commitments and 2009 Directive on the promotion of renewables.159 
The initial decision to withdraw from nuclear power after the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster these projects took precedence. The Arab Spring has also pushed the EU 
member states to take action in North Africa, where major changes were occurring. The 
155 UfM Secreteriat, “Building the MSP Master Plan: Discussion Paper,” 
http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/DISCUSSION-PAPER-
MSP-Master-Plan.pdf.    
 
156 Union for Mediterranean, “Mediterranean Solar Plan,” Available at: 
http://ufmsecretariat.org/mediterranean-solar-plan/ Last modified: January 19, 2012. 
 
157 Marcus Marktanner and Lana Salman, “economic and geopolitical dimensions of 
renewable vs. nuclear energy in North Africa,” Energy Policy 39 (2011): 4483.  
 
158 Ibid. 4480.  
 
159 This directive regulates the mechanisms under which the joint projects between the 
EU and Southern Mediterranean countries can undertake. Several cooperation 
mechanisms allow the member states to agree on the degree of support and how to share 
the production with a view to the national objectives. Hakim Darbouche, “Energy Issues 
and the Prospects of the Mediterranean Solar Plan,” EUROMED  15 p. 133.  
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probability of the countries becoming democratic regimes has placed emphasize back to 
this region. Hence, starting with economic cooperation was seen as the best option to 
pave the way to integration of the two shores of the Mediterranean. However, the plans 
just looked feasible on the paper, in reality the financial and regulatory problems are 
serious barriers. 
 
Considering the period of transition to renewable energies, support is needed to 
advance the learning curve to be able to compete in the international market, but the 
lack of institutions raises the regulatory risk and hinders high capital intensity 
investments. In the mean time, creation of suitable conditions for a sustainable 
framework for long-term development is crucial. As discussed above, the five North 
African countries have been making progress in their legislations but at different rates. 
Still in many of the states, regulatory and institutional barriers exist, preventing further 
research on the potentials and deployment of projects. Even in 2009 before the Arab 
Spring, the RE investments in MENA region was stuck at 2,5 percent of the global 
investments made that year.160 Findings also indicate that by February 2010, only 10,3 
GW of renewable energy project proposals was identified in the MPCs, which only half 
of the 20 GW aim. Another €21 billion is needed by 2020 that is fivefold of the quantity 
spent in conventional electricity production in the last ten years.161 The Observatorie 
Mediterranéen de l’Énergie estimates € 320 billion of investment is necessary to keep 
up with growing demand in the Southern Mediterranean countries until 2020.162 Since it 
requires a long time for the RES to be cost-competitive, funds are necessary to finance 
the projects. Public funds would have the biggest share, no country, with the exception 
160 UNEP, “Reforming Energy Subsidies: Opportunities to Contribute to the Climate 
Change. Division of Technology, Industry and Economics,” Available at: 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/pressreleases/ reforming_energy_subsidies.pdf.  
 
161 Sophie Jablonski et. al. “The Mediterranean Solar Plan: Project proposals for 
renewable energy in the Mediterranean Partner Countries region,” Energy Policy 
44(2012) pp. 297-8.  
 
162 Observatoire Mediterraneen de L’Energie, Mediterranean Energy Perspective 2011, 
(OME: Nanterre, 2011) p.87. 
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of Algeria, no other state has put significant amount of money yet.163 Private funds are 
also crucial, but with the lack of regulatory system, rules and liberal business 
environment the protection of investments cannot be guaranteed. Lastly, the 
international financial institutions may also give funds to the region and the same 
insecurities will be felt. From this discussion it is clear that without solving the 
regulatory issues the funds would not enter these countries.  
 
The MSP was supposed to offer the opportunity for closer Euro-Mediterranean 
integration. The policy makers in the EU were hoping for the spillover effect, because 
the EU itself was based on the basic cooperation in coal and steel, before evolving into 
a strong political union. According to Mitrany, this is how closer integration among 
self-interested nation-states is formed. Hence, in the case of South Mediterranean itself, 
the aspiration was to start from economic collaboration, which in time would lead to 
closer integration in other areas as well. The MSP’s ties with the institutional 
framework of UfM and ENP make it a cooperation program. Since the development of 
renewable energies require a common institutional and regulatory system, at least at the 
South-South level integration is inevitable. Such an improvement and harmonization 
would also lead to the installation of new generation and transmission capacities as 
shown in Table 8 below. However, until today a comprehensive regulatory convergence 
could not be achieved due to the reasons discussed above. The uncertainties concerning 
the kind of technologies, the quantity and the capacity of the electricity generation 
installations, the transmission grids, and funding mechanisms are all slowing down the 
process. Hence, without a realistic approach and careful consideration the credibility of 
the plan, it will fall even more.164 Next, three immediate measures to be taken are 
elaborated upon in the coming section.  
 
      
 
          
       
163 Hakim Darbouche, “Energy Issues and the Prospects of the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan,” EUROMED  15 p. 136 
 
164 Benavides P. Salas, “The Energy and the presidency and Spain in the EU,” 
Cuadernos de Energía 27, (2010): 18-22. 
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4.4 Future Prospects 
 
Several forums, summits, conferences since the declaration of UfM have 
emphasized the significance of Euro-Mediterranean regional integration. For instance, 
the 2005 Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Summit adopted objectives with regard to 
electricity integration of Mashreq and Maghreb with the EU network.165 In 2007 the 
Limassol Ministerial Conference came up with a Priority Action Plan that supports the 
reforms of the MPCs, integration of markets and harmonization.166 However, these 
efforts did not result in further integration. There are three vital challenges to be dealt 
with: construction of transmission grids, designing a regulatory system encouraging 
integration, and an institutional framework binding the states.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty and Community energy policy aim to promote the 
construction and development of trans-European national grid interconnection. Through 
technical standardization and cross-border interconnection they want to prompt joint 
projects and boost solidarity in the field of energy. There are three options available to 
transmit electricity between the two shores: development of existing grids between the 
Strait of Gibraltar and the Bosporus, underwater connections with HVDC lines or 
combining the two.167 Many studies have pointed out the supremacy of HVDC power 
lines to transmit electricity across borders with minimum losses in long distances. This 
would facilitate the optimum transmission of the electricity generated with renewable 
energies to European electricity markets. Another benefit is that the EU’s energy 
security would also increase due to its diminishing dependency on Russian policy. The 
key point is to coordinate the layout of corridors of electricity generated from 
renewables and the policies that support them. Here again the significance of a credible 
regulatory system that encourages integration of renewables into the Euro-
165 Europa, “Euromed Summit, Barcelona 27 – 28 November 2005,” Available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/summit1105/  
 
166 Europa, “Andris Piebalgs’ Press Release,’ Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-07-827_en.htm  
167 MED – EMIP, “Medring Update: Analysis and proposals of Solutions for the 
Closure of the Ring and North-South Electrical Corridors,”_Med-Emip 1, no.2 (2010): 
8. 
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Mediterranean area comes forward. The community itself is aware of the difficulty in 
establishing such a framework, thus it prefers FIT / bonus mechanisms. Since FITs are 
tied to production costs and in the Southern Mediterranean countries due to climate 
conditions the costs are low, the EU Member States may be encouraged to pay. 
Although the amount paid will be low, the states in the south may be induced to 
produce more. It is also a better idea to support feasible short-term plans that can be 
adapted to the regional level in the future. This can lead to more profitable investments 
and greater credibility of MSP. The right institutional framework can establish this 
regulatory system. Hence the last component of a successful integration in the Euro-
Mediterranean area is possible with institutions that can form joint support projects. A 
harmonization even at a minimum level can ensure transparency, certification, and grid 
access. The EU can extend its Energy Community Treaty to these countries to shape the 
energy systems in line with the acquis in the long run, because currently most of the 
MPCs cannot adapt to the conditions of grid energies, gas and electricity. 168 Thus, 
rather than an one-size-fits-all approach, bilateral cooperation that can evolve first to 
sub-regional, and then to the regional level. This may allow for a softer transition to a 
more rigid integration.   
 
At the national level, bilateral agreements allow the states to use their 
comparative natural resources advantages and take control over the share of support 
given to renewable energy. Hence, the EU has to take into consideration some key 
points while doing the bilateral agreements as well such as the longevity, certainty and 
transparency are the key components of a well-designed policy framework. The 
empowerment of the R&D field, the adjustment of the industries and investors depend 
on these conditions. Furthermore, co-development based on comprehensive dialogue 
among the governments is vital to keep the North African countries engaged in the 
process. Relating to the policy considerations, the design of the market shall also be 
carefully researched and adapted to the needs of the North African countries. 
Information sharing, risk mitigation mechanisms and capacity building are three 
essential axes of this design if they want to attract more investors. Especially more 
transparent information on the technology, projects and price can enable the risk 
168 Gonzalo Escribano, “Convergence towards Differentiation: The Case of 
Mediterranean Energy Corridors,” Mediterranean Politics 15, no.2 (2010): 74. 
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premiums to fall, leading to tighter collaborations between the two sides. The next step 
after planning and investments is the infrastructure. The EU has formed two new 
organizations to deal with the promotion and transformation of the infrastructure: the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). 169  The former is in 
charge of the development of common standards and approaches for cross-border 
commerce, the later promotes centralized long term planning, reliable operation and 
management for the transformation of existing infrastructure. Both of this agencies 
work on the European level and may extent their operations to its neighbors in the 
coming years. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the EU can only integrate 
further with this region in the RE field if it takes into account the priorities of North 
African countries. Careful planning, precise policies, proper market design and modern 
electricity grids for transmission are the initial steps to be taken. Besides the 
contribution to the economies of both sides of the Mediterranean, these projects will add 
to the fight against climate change challenges as well. Hence, after the initial steps are 
taken, the stakeholders should take an more ambitious aims and impose stricter 
renewable targets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 Although ACER aims at the completion of the EU’s internal energy market for 
electricity and natural gas, this framework can be extended to the southern countries. 
ACER, “Mission and Objectives,” Available at: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/The_agency/Mission_and_Objectives/Pages/default.aspx, 
Likewise ENTSO-E is also serving the EU’s transmission system operators, this system 
can also be exported to the North African countries. ENTSO-E, “Mission and Vision,” 
Available at: https://www.entsoe.eu/about-entso-e/inside-entso-e/mission-and-vision/  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
Energy is what provides light, heats houses, mobilizes people around the world 
and most importantly enables economic growth. As seen throughout the thesis energy 
issues cannot be separated from international relations. To begin with, oil and gas are 
limited commodities and demand for them increases due to growing population and 
consumerism. Although renewable energy sources constitute an alternative, only 2.5 
percent of the demand is met by renewables at present.170 There is no such thing as an 
energy island exempt from others; states need to cooperate and sometimes such 
interactions do not result well. Especially considering that soon 80 percent of the oil 
traded will originate from ‘non-liberal’ Russia, Middle East and Africa,171 none of 
which are easy to deal with, and importer countries may need to find means of 
compromising with them. In addition, relations between states have gotten more 
complicated and sophisticated; hence the fierce of IR has divided into subcategories to 
deal with the complexities. Energy security became one of such subcategories, 
particularly after the oil shocks of 1970s and gas cut-offs of the 2000s, when resources 
became bargaining chips.172 Moreover, maintaining and expanding energy supplies will 
170 Nick Butler, “Energy and IR: the Changing Agenda,” (speech, Johns Hopkins 
University, Washington, September 19, 2005) Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=98&contentId=7009436 
 
171 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remarking of the Modern 
World. (London: Allen Lane, 2011) p. 8. 
 
172 Nazli Choucri, International Politics of Energy Interdependence, (Massachusetts: 
D.C. Heath, 1977) pp. 185-186. 
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entail $16,000 billion of investment through 2030. 173  Exploiting new resources, 
building a modern infrastructure to transport and tanks to store them will be the main 
investment areas. These are crucial to maintaining a secure supply of energy and 
stability of the global market in the future. Interdependence in every field is 
unavoidable, but energy in particular is going to be a crucial area that links states. It will 
be the foremost molder of 21st century politics and economics. The EU was well aware 
of that fact and expanded its relations. 
 
The 1990s was the decade of the great leap forward for the EU, as it was 
accepting new members and implementing its neighborhood policy to the others. The 
EU and the North African countries’ energy cooperation have been perceived as a 
profitable one. On the North shore of the Mediterranean, the technologically advanced 
states are seeking to gain access to the renewable energy – rich south shore that lacks 
advanced ways to extract its sources. However, what is verified in theory may not 
always be true in practice. In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, the EU was 
very keen to have close relations with all of its neighbors. After the ‘big bang’ 
enlargement in 1995, many of the ‘Eastern bloc’ countries became Member States and 
the EU also launched the ENP for the countries that had a slim chance to become full 
members. What the EU was expecting from the participants was that they conform to its 
norms. Some of the states were not content with this one-size-fits-all approach and 
proceeded with their own practices. Considering the authoritarian regimes in North 
Africa lasting for almost three decades this argument can be conformed. However, the 
EU was also keen to develop its trade relations with the countries among which some 
were former colonies of France and Britain. Since it is a win-win situation, most of the 
investments were suppose to be welcomed by the Maghreb states. However, this was 
not the case. To begin with, the EMP has suffered from failing attempts, while the UfM 
was not “another nail in the coffin”174 of the vision inspiring the launch of EMP in 
1995. All the efforts have predicated collaboration on security, region-building, political 
173 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Investment Outlook Sees Need for 
$16,000 billion of Energy Investment through 2030, Highlights Major Challenges in 
Mobilising Capital,” last modified November 4, 2003. Available at: 
http://www.iea.org/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=107.  
 
174 Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs, “The end of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean vision’,” 
International Affairs 85, no. 5 (2009): 971. 
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modernization and economic matters, while in reality Europe and North Africa shifted 
further away. For instance in the economic field the investments remained limited and 
largely state-led that hindered grassroots economic activity. This statist development via 
big projects has offered little to the local economies. The same problems also apply to 
the energy field, although with the right projects there is much to be gained.  
 
 The 2006 and 2009 natural gas crisis with Russia and the nuclear disaster in 
Japan have also accelerated the process of energy diversification. Diminishing the 
dependency on Russia and varying the energy mix by increasing the share of 
renewables have been the priorities since the last decade. It has been trying hard to 
reach its RE targets of 2020 by encouraging the investments and providing FITs. Hence, 
with several initiatives and projects the untapped renewable potential on the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean was supposed to be seized upon. North African countries 
have their own domestic considerations: the fiscal imbalances, poverty trends, rapid 
population growth and increasing energy demands made even the exporter countries 
enthusiastic about the renewable energy projects. However, the chronic problems of 
energy subsidies, lack of infrastructure, regulatory issues and non-liberal electricity 
market structure have disrupted the process. In addition, the Arab uprisings and the 
political turmoil that followed added to the reverting. The EU was concerned with the 
regime changes and the security of the pipelines, which made them cautious about 
making further investments in this region. In addition, its fixation on Russia has not 
changed much and North Africa as an alternative power supplier has not caught enough 
attention. Even after the uprisings and change of leaders, the countries still have a long 
way to fully democratize. Thus, until the regimes consolidate, the financial and 
regulatory problems will prevent further integration in the energy field.  
 
 As long as the EU overlooks the North African states unique features and do not 
provide a tailor made approach to each one of them, the full collaboration will be 
delayed further, because this time the Europeanization approach which is a mechanical, 
market-based and ones-size-fits-all method has alienated the southern shore countries. 
The UfM has aimed to change this by having a bilateral and project-based procedure in 
terms of energy. So far the two biggest initiatives to boost the RES were the MSP and 
DESERTEC. Both of them started with ambitious goals, but they have again not taken 
into account the specific needs of the individual countries. Hence, such large-scale 
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projects are destined to fail if necessary regulatory and financial adjustments are not 
made. However, the adjustments should not emanate from the EU’s norms and 
standards, but put the preferences of the host countries’ to the front. After the Arab 
uprisings most of the states have gone through substantial changes that continue to this 
day.  Obviously full liberalization of the regulatory and electricity market system will 
hold off. The EU should also carefully assess the transitions and adjust its policies 
accordingly. In addition, it is proven that solid projects have greater impact compared to 
vague aims of political and economic partnerships. Because solid projects are geared 
towards providing jobs and stimulate new industries that will enhance the lives of the 
population in general. Collaboration in energy has also pointed out that, if the EU shifts 
its emphasis from the neo-liberal and rules-based cooperation model to addressing 
‘practical’ issues with specific projects, the impact is greater and partners are more 
willing to participate. All these issues and arguments discussed in this paragraph are 
controversial and would lead to further scholarly debates.  
 
 Energy relations have been and will continue to be a widely discussed topic. In 
the context of this thesis, the issues surrounding the Euro–Mediterranean area are going 
to spark several other scholarly debates. To begin with, theoretical discussion of the 
EMP, ENP and UfM has not been provided. The EU integration theories can be applied 
using the initiatives as case studies. Since, only two years have passed since the 
beginning of Arab uprisings, it is too early to come up with definitive results. Although 
some minor comments as to the effects on the RES investments were given, further 
debates shall follow in the coming years after the regimes stabilize. Bilateral agreements 
based on the specific needs of the countries have been offered as a better alternative to 
the current large-scale initiatives. However, there are still other solutions that do not 
necessarily involve the EU. After the regimes consolidate and democratize it may be 
possible to ‘cure’ the Dutch disease and form a union resembling the EU. Again, 
forceful arguments for and against this statement can be made. Two energy hungry 
giants India and China have not been major investors in this area, but they will most 
probably be in the future. They have a flexible investment approach compared to the 
EU, which would give it a hard time. Hence further scholarly debates of these scenarios 
are likely to follow. 
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